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At a glance 
 
x There remains a high degree of uncertainty around near-WHUPIRUHFDVWVIRU6FRWODQG¶V
economy in the light of the EU referendum outcome.   
 
x On balance, we continue to forecast a weak outlook with growth below trend to 2019.  This is 
on the back of continued growth in the 2nd half of 2016, albeit at a slow pace. We expect the 
economy to have grown by around 1% this year, well below the UK.  
 
x But the UK economy has held up well since June and this momentum is likely to spill-over into 
2017 allowing us to make a welcome upward revision to our Scottish outlook. Moreover the 
fall in Sterling, Bank of England stimulus, signs that the UK will press for a transition and not a 
µFOLII-HGJH¶ZKHQOHDYLQJWKH6LQJOH0DUNHWDQGDVOLJKWO\OHVVSHVVLPLVWLFHQYLURQPHQWIRU the 
North Sea, have all helped to improve the near-term outlook relative to our July forecasts.  
 
x However, these effects will only partially mitigate ± rather than fully offset ± the challenges 
posed by Brexit. Consumption and investment growth are likely to slow significantly in 2017 
and 2018 relative to our pre-referendum forecasts. Unemployment will be higher and earnings 
will be lower with working households feeling the pinch.   
 
x Our central forecast is for growth of 1.1% in 2017, 1.3% in 2018 and 1.6% in 2019 ± a revision 
of around +0.15 % points per quarter for 2017. However, these could change materially under 
different circumstances. During these uncertain times we recommend that just as much focus 
is given to the full range of estimates that underpin this outlook as to any specific estimates.  
 
 
FAI forecast Scottish GVA growth (%) by sector, 2016 to 2019 
 2016 2017 2018 2019 
GVA 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.6 
Production 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.8 
Construction 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Services 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.5 
 
 
 
Forecast Scottish unemployment, 2017 to 2019 
2017 2018 2019 
Unemployment  151,100 155,750 166,400 
Rate (%)1 5.6 5.7 5.9 
Note: Rounded to the nearest 50. 1 = Rate calculated as total ILO 
unemployment by total economically active population 16+. 
 
 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute  
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Summary 
The Scottish economy returned to growth 
during the second quarter of 2016, and most 
indicators suggest that growth has continued 
± albeit at a relatively slow pace ± through 
the remainder of the year.  
Employment in Scotland remains close to 
record levels.  
However, Scotland continues to lag the UK 
ZLWK6FRWODQG¶VUHFHQWJURZWKUDWHMXVWRI
that in the UK. We expect Scotland to have 
grown by around 1% this year, broadly in 
line with our July forecast.  
Whilst unemployment has fallen sharply 
recently, this appears to stem, not from 
people finding work, but from people exiting 
the labour force. 
With new tax powers coming on-stream in 
April, it is vital that the gap with the UK is 
closed.  
Overall, the UK economy has held up well 
since the EU referendum. There are a 
number of reasons for this.  
Firstly, stronger than expected growth in 
early 2016 has helped propel the economy 
through the summer and autumn 
uncertainty.   
Secondly, sentiment was boosted by the 
larger than anticipated stimulus from the 
Bank of England ± which included a further 
cut in interest rates.  
Thirdly, the value of Sterling has fallen 
sharply. In the short-term, this is supporting 
exporters and boosting overseas income, 
but at the cost of higher inflation.   
Fourthly and arguably most importantly, the 
immediate risk during July and August was a 
sharp loss of confidence. After an uncertain 
start, the UK Government ± supported by 
the Bank of England ± has acted swiftly to 
counter any threats to overall 
macroeconomic stability. Moreover, the 
signals that the government will seek a 
WUDQVLWLRQUDWKHUWKDQDµFOLII-HGJH¶H[LWIURP
the Single Market has allowed businesses to 
press on with day-to-day activities.  
But earnings are down and productivity 
remains dire. The public finances have been 
hit with additional borrowing of £120bn now 
forecast by 2020-21. 
The outlook for the North Sea is marginally 
more positive than in July. Tentative signs of 
a stabilisation in confidence, coupled with a 
rise in the oil price from its early 2016 low, 
offer a glimmer of hope for 2017.  
It should be noted that, while the recent 
positive developments in the UK economy 
are to be welcomed, they will only partially 
mitigate ± rather than fully offset ± the 
challenges of Brexit. 
Brexit poses questions about the 
fundamental structure of our economy and 
these will take time to emerge and feed 
through to the hard economic data.  
Our expectation is that growth will remain 
below trend through the forecast period.  
Our central forecast is for growth of 1.1% in 
2017, 1.3% in 2018 and 1.6% in 2019. 
Unemployment is likely to rise in 2017 and 
earnings growth will remain weak.  
But there remains a considerable degree of 
uncertainty around forecasts in the current 
climate. If, for example, the process for 
triggering Article 50 is delayed or there is a 
hit to economic confidence, then this could 
have a material impact on the outlook.    
 
 
Fraser of Allander Institute 
December 2016 
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Outlook and Appraisal 
 
The Scottish economy returned to growth in Q2 2016 and growth is expected to have 
been sustained through the year. But annual growth in the twelve months to June of 
just 0.7% (vs. 2.2% for the UK) remains disappointing. Economic prospects remain 
highly uncertain as the UK prepares to negotiate to leave the EU  
Table 1: Scottish GDP growth (%) by sector, Q2 2016 
 GDP Agriculture Production Construction Services 
Quarterly 
Growth 
 
 
+0.4 +0.9 +0.3 -1.9 +0.5 
UK  
 
+0.7 -1.0 +2.1 -0.1 +0.6 
Annual 
Growth 
 
 
+0.7 +1.9 -2.9 -4.5 +2.0 
UK +2.2 -0.7 +1.6 +0.4 +2.7 
Source: Scottish Government
 
 
Table 2: UK labour market, Jul-Sep 2016 
 Employment 
(16-64) 
Unemployment 
(16+) 
Inactivity 
(16-64) 
Scotland 73.6% 4.7% 22.6% 
England 74.8% 4.8% 21.3% 
Wales 73.1% 4.4% 23.4% 
N. Ire 69.9% 5.6% 25.8% 
UK 74.5% 4.8% 21.7% 
Source: ONS, LFS 
 
 
Chart 1: Independent forecasts for UK growth 2017 
 
Source: HM Treasury
 
 
Introduction 
The Scottish economy grew by +0.4% in Q2 2016 
up from -0.0% in Q1. Most indicators suggest that 
this growth has continued ± albeit at a relatively 
slow pace ± through the 2nd half of the year.  
Despite the ongoing challenges in the oil and gas 
sector, employment in Scotland remains close to 
record levels. Overall, the Scottish economy has 
been relatively resilient to recent headwinds.  
+RZHYHUWKHUHDUHFKDOOHQJHV6FRWODQG¶VJURZWK
rate lags the rest of the UK, whilst the recent fall in 
unemployment stems, not from people finding 
work, but from people exiting the labour force. 
The UK economy has held up well since the EU 
referendum. A number of factors explain this 
resilience, including the larger than expected drop 
in the value of Sterling boosting exports and a bold 
stimulus package from the Bank of England.  
At the same time, the UK economy appears to 
have had greater momentum in the first half of 
2016 than initial data suggested. This has helped 
support growth through a summer and autumn of 
uncertainty. There has also been a marked drop-
off in UK political instability of late.  
However, employment growth has eased, 
productivity and earnings remain weak and 
inflation has picked up.  
Most forecasters have revised down their 
expectations for UK growth in 2017 and 2018, 
albeit the average of these forecasts has risen a 
little since the summer and the range of predicted 
outcomes has narrowed. This, in turn, has an 
impact on our own forecasts for Scotland.  
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Table 3: OECD forecasts for G7 Growth 
 
2016 2017 2018 
UK 2.0 1.2 1.0 
US 1.5 2.3 3.0 
Japan 0.8 1.0 0.8 
Canada 1.2 2.1 2.3 
Euro Area 1.7 1.6 1.7 
Germany 1.7 1.7 1.7 
France 1.2 1.3 1.6 
Italy 0.8 0.9 1.0 
Source: OECD
 
 
Chart 2: European unemployment rates, Q3 2016 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
 
Chart 3: Rise in global oil prices since start of 2016 
 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream 
 
 
 
The global economy 
The UK is on track to be the fastest growing G7 
economy in 2016 ± although it is expected to slow 
relative to its competitors in 2017 and 2018.  
US growth is expected to pick-up, even prior to 
factoring in any stimulus package from President-
elect Trump.   
Having recovered from its weakness in 2013, Euro 
Area growth has been steady over the past two 
years (although growth remains weak by historical 
standards). Political and economic stability 
concerns remain including ongoing questions over 
some EU banks, nowhere more so than in Italy.  
Unemployment remains high ± 10% in the Euro 
Area ± and without major reform it is difficult to see 
how this will fall significantly in the next few years.   
Overall, global economic conditions remain finely 
balanced. The IMF believes that a complex mix of 
economic realignment, structural challenges and 
new shocks will lead to subdued growth, and 
increased uncertainty, in the short-term.  
The risks are judged to lie to the downside, largely 
due to ongoing vulnerabilities in emerging 
economies.  
Over the past few years, growth in China has 
slowed from around 10% to closer to 6.5%. 
Toward the end of 2015, there had been concerns 
of a hard landing. Those fears have diminished 
somewhat, although growth continues to depend 
upon rising levels of credit which poses a risk to 
medium-term sustainability. 
Global inflation remains relatively subdued 
following the fall in oil prices in 2014±15.  
Following two years of over-supply, the wRUOG¶V
leading oil producers have finally responded with 
plans to cut production to put a $50-a-barrel floor 
under the price of oil and push it towards $60. 
Prospects to go much above seem remote, 
particularly with continued efficiency improvements 
in US shale operations. Even then, a price of $60 
is a much more attractive proposition for 
6FRWODQG¶V1RUWK6HDSURGXFHUVWKDQWKHORZRI
below $30 in January 2016.  
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Chart 4: Purchasing Managers Index (PMI) for UK  
 
Source: IHS Markit 
* Above 50 = expansion of activity, below 50 = contraction. 
 
 
Chart 5: External uncertainty Deloitte survey of chief 
finance officers ± ³XQFHUWDLQW\YKLJK´ 
 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream 
 
 
Chart 6: Investment intentions slowing for next 12 months 
± %DQNRI(QJODQGDJHQWV¶VXUYH\WR4 
 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream 
 
 
The UK economy 
The UK economy ± and consumer spending in 
particular ± has held up remarkably well following 
the EU referendum.  
Most forecasters, including the Bank of England, 
predicted that demand would slow materially 
during the 2nd half of 2016, although there was 
admittedly considerable uncertainty around such a 
judgement. 
Initially, survey indicators of economic activity fell 
markedly to levels consistent with a sharp fall in 
output. They have however, re-bounded strongly.   
Measures of uncertainty also spiked after the 
referendum, and such uncertainty had been 
expected to remain elevated in the near term. But 
they too have returned to more normal levels.  
Since then, any slowdown in growth has been less 
severe than those indicators initially suggested. 
The UK economy grew by 0.5% in Q3 2016, in line 
ZLWKWKH2%5¶V0DUFKIRUHFDVWEXWGRZQIURP
0.7% in Q2. 
On balance the UK economy is expected to come 
in close to pre-referendum expectations for overall 
growth in 2016.  
The slowing in Q3 mainly reflected falls in 
manufacturing and construction, although services 
also grew more slowly. In part, this is likely to have 
reflected a weakening in commercial real estate 
with consumer-facing services strengthening 
further. 
Indeed, the key driver of growth in the UK 
economy during 2016 ± as in the past two years ± 
has been in household spending. This had been 
projected to ease in 2016, but the data for the 2nd 
half of 2016 ± including leading indicators such as 
new car registrations and retail sales ± suggest 
that growth has remained robust.  
There is growing evidence that investment 
intentions have slowed. A result supported by 
surveys from the CBI and Bank of England agents. 
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Chart 7: Contributions to average quarterly GDP by 
expenditure (outturn and OBR) forecast 
 
 
Source: ONS & OBR
 
 
Chart 8: Sharp fall in sterling since referendum 
 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream
 
 
Table 4: OBR forecast, Autumn Statement 2016  
 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
GDP 2.1 1.4 1.7 2.1 2.1 
change +0.1 -0.8 -0.4 0.0 0.0 
Consumption 2.8 1.2 1.1 2.1 2.0 
change +0.4 -1.0 -1.0 +0.1 +0.1 
Business Investment -2.2 -0.3 4.1 5.3 4.1 
change -4.7 -6.3 -1.8 -0.2 -0.3 
CPI Inflation 0.7 2.3 2.5 2.1 2.0 
change 0.0 +0.7 +0.5 +0.1 0.0 
Unemployment (% rate) 5.0 5.2 5.5 5.4 5.4 
change 0.0 +0.2 +0.3 +0.1 +0.0 
Source: OBR  
* Italics are change from March forecast 
 
 
There is little evidence of Brexit-induced 
uncertainty depressing day-to-day spending thus 
far. Part of the reason has been ongoing growth in 
house prices ± particularly in London and the 
South East ± which has helped to support 
household spending.  
Households had also been benefiting from 
improving real earnings boosted by relatively low 
inflation at the start of the year.  
But this is likely to change in the months ahead 
with inflation to increase sharply as import prices 
rise. Since the referendum, the value of the pound 
has fallen significantly ± and is now around 15% 
lower than where it started 2016.  
This has helped to boost exports and returns on 
financial markets (with overseas earnings 
benefiting from the lower value of the pound).  
However a sharp depreciation is a double-edged 
sword. By lowering real earnings, higher inflation 
will erode livings standards and hit household 
spending hard over the next couple of years.  
The UK economic outlook 
As highlighted above, most forecasters have 
revised down their predictions for the UK economy 
for 2017 and 2018. However, there remains 
considerable debate over the scale of the 
slowdown, the timing of any Brexit-impacts and the 
extent of the risks involved.  
This, as the OBR took great pains to point out in 
their Economic & Fiscal Outlook, stems from 
IRUHFDVWHUVEHLQJµOLWWOHWKHZLVHU¶ZLWKUHJDUGWRWKH
8.*RYHUQPHQW¶VQHJRWLDWLQJVWUDWHJ\IRUWKH
terms of exiting the EU.  
Based on this uncertainty, most forecasters have 
had to make a number of important judgement 
calls. The most important of which is when the UK 
will actually trigger Article 50.  
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Chart 9: OBR growth forecast ± downward revision for 
2017 & 18 from lower investment and consumer spending 
 
Source: OBR 
 
 
Chart 10: Inflation forecast to pick-up and be above 
target of 2% until 2020 
 
Source: Bank of England
 
 
Chart 11: Forecast comparisons ± OBR more optimistic 
 
Source: OBR, Band of England, HM Treasury  
 
 
 
As we highlighted in our July 2016 Economic 
Commentary, it is important to distinguish between 
the short-term and the long-term (more structural) 
implications of Brexit.  
Most economists predict that once the UK has left 
the EU, it will face a more challenging environment 
for trade, labour mobility and investment as we 
become less integrated with our largest trading 
partner.  
Productivity ± the key to long-term prosperity ± 
may also be weaker if leaving the Single Market 
reduces competition, skilled migration, inward 
investment and financial integration.  
There will however, be opportunities. Businesses 
will find new markets and sectors to operate in and 
policy may change.   
The short-run dynamics are more complex and 
uncertain. Businesses will not ± and cannot ± 
adjust their plans overnight. They may put off 
major decisions until the final settlement is known, 
but day-to-day domestic trends in demand are 
likely to be of more immediate significance. 
In looking at the near-term outlook, most 
economists predict that on balance, growth will 
slow in 2017 and 2018.  
Higher levels of uncertainty are likely to lead to 
some investment being postponed or cancelled. At 
the same time, the fall in Sterling ± Chart 8 ± will 
feed through to higher inflation which will in turn 
impact real earnings and household spending.  
$JDLQVWWKLV6WHUOLQJ¶VGHSUHFLDWLRQZLOOKHOS
exporters and sectors such as tourism, although it 
will have a negative impact on those more 
dependent on supply chain imports. The stimulus 
from the Bank of England will continue to support 
the economy in the near term ± with no real 
prospect of an interest rate rise soon ± whilst the 
pace of fiscal consolidation has also eased slightly.  
However, the OBR still predict that the UK 
economy will be around £30 billion smaller in 2020 
than they forecast back in March.  
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Chart 12: Potential output and forecast outturn ± 
permanent hit to output since 2010 and gap widening  
 
Source: OBR, BofE, HMT  
 
 
Table 5: UK productivity performance remains dire 
 
Annual % 
change 
Output per 
hour 
worked 
UK productivity was growing at close to 
its historical average of around 2% per 
year in the decade prior to the 2008-09 
financial crisis.  
 
Since then, productivity growth has 
been largely stagnant.  
2011 0.9 
2012 -0.8 
2013 -0.5 
2014 0.6 
2015 0.9 
2016 Q1 0.5 
2016 Q2 0.4 
Source: ONS
 
 
Chart 13: Weak outlook for real household income   
 
 Source: Office for Budget Responsibility 
 
 
 
The OBR are however, slightly more optimistic 
than most forecasters, including the Bank of 
England. And both are more optimistic than the 
average of independent forecasters.  
In particular, the OBR predict near trend growth of 
2.1% in 2019 following a bounce back in activity ± 
something that the Bank is less certain of.   
In the medium to long term, the most important 
driver of growth and living standards is what 
happens to potential output. This is the estimated 
level of activity that the economy can produce 
without rising inflation. The key (but also uncertain) 
driver of potential output is productivity.   
Needless to say, there is greater uncertainty than 
usual around the judgements for the path of 
potential output post-Brexit.  
To the extent that any slowdown is not just a 
normal cyclical change but also a hit to potential 
output ± i.e. from lower investment, reduced 
migration etc. ± the weaker the economy will be in 
the long-run.    
7KH8.¶VSRRUSURGXFWLYLW\SHUIRUPDQFHFDQQRWEH
traced just to Brexit. ,QGHHGLW¶VEHHQDFRQVLVWHQW
feature since 2008. The reasons however, remain 
a source of heated debate.  
Since 2010, the OBR has consistently predicted 
that the UK economy will return to its long-term 
trend productivity growth rate in time. But each 
year this has failed to materialise.    
Weak productivity is the key reason earnings have 
performed so poorly in recent years, and why tax 
revenues have been below forecast. 
With poor productivity growth and rising inflation, 
most forecasts for earnings are dismal. The 
Institute for Fiscal Studies predict that earnings will 
not recover to 2008 levels until 2020 at the 
earliest.  
Coupled with uncertain prospects for employment 
and a freeze in many working-age benefits, the 
outlook for many households will be challenging 
with real income rising just 0.1% points in 2017.  
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Chart 14: Causes of higher borrowing ± Brexit and other 
factors 
 
 
Source: OBR 
 
 
Table 6: Changing UK Fiscal Rules  
Previous Rules  On track 
Fiscal Mandate Surplus on net borrowing by 19-20 × 
Supplementary 
Target 
Net debt to fall as % of GDP in each 
year to 2019-20 × 
Welfare Cap Annual limits on welfare to 2020-21. × 
New Rules   
Structural Deficit Cyclically adjusted borrowing to be below 2% of GDP in 20-21 9 
Debt Net debt to fall as % of GDP by 20-21 (and not each year) 9 
Welfare Cap Subset of welfare spending to be below new cap set for 21-22.  9 
Source: OBR 
 
 
Chart 15: UK private sector debt high and increasing 
 
Source: OBR 
 
 
The autumn statement 
The combination of a near-term economic 
slowdown and a permanent hit to productivity has 
led most economists to predict a weakening in the 
UK public finances over the next few years.  
,Q1RYHPEHU¶V$XWXPQ6WDWHPHQWWKHQHZ
Chancellor outlined revised forecasts for the public 
finances which included over £120 billion of 
additional borrowing to 2020-21.  
The biggest driver ± around 50% - of this increase 
can be attributed to the weaker economic outlook 
from Brexit. However, it also includes substantial 
revisions to receipts, particularly in 2016-17 and 
2017-18, in the light of poorer tax revenues more 
generally.   
The Statement included a stimulus of around £9 
billion by 2020-21 ± compareGWR0DUFK¶V%XGJHW± 
with a particular focus on productivity.  
The Chancellor is now no longer on track to meet 
KLVSUHGHFHVVRU¶VJRDORIUXQQLQJDILVFDOVXUSOXV
by 2019-20. Indeed, instead of a fiscal surplus of 
£10 billion in 2019-20, the OBR now forecast that 
the UK will be running a deficit of £20 billion.  
In response, the Chancellor opted neither for a 
large stimulus nor more austerity (at least for now) 
and chose instead to abandon the fiscal rules. 10 
RIWKH8.¶VILVFDOUXOHVVLQFHKDYHQRw 
either been broken or abandoned.  
7KHQHZORRVHUµILVFDOPDQGDWH¶LVWRUXQD
cyclically adjusted deficit of less than 2% of GDP 
by 2020-21. Based on current forecasts rather 
than be seen as a tight constraint on borrowing, it 
is more akin to an upper limit ± with around £26 
billion spare in case the outlook deteriorates. 
Much of the recent debate has centred upon the 
scale of public debt ± at nearly 90% of GDP. Of 
perhaps greater concern, and much less 
discussed, is the recent return to growing levels of 
private sector debt. Indebtedness of this scale ± 
particularly amongst households ± has the 
potential to pose long-term structural challenges, 
particularly if earnings remain weak.  
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Table 7: Scottish Budget: 16-17 to 20-21 (real-terms in 
16-17 prices)  
 
16-17 17-18 18-19 19-20 20-21 
£ million (16-17 prices) 
RDEL £26,088 £26,112 £25,624 £25,271 £25,219 
Change on 16/17 £24 -£463 -£816 -£869 
Cumulative change  20/21 on 16-17 -£2,124 
CDEL £ 2,891 £ 3,042 £3,187 £ 3,330 £3,386 
Change on 16/17 £150 £296 £438 £494 
Cumulative change  20/21 on 16-17 £1,378 
 Source: Fraser of Allander
 
 
Chart 16: Scottish Government Resource Budget 
Outlook   
 
 Source: Fraser of Allander 
 
 
Chart 17: Scottish Government Capital Budget Outlook  
 
 Source: Fraser of Allander 
 
 
 
 
The autumn statement and Scotland  
7KLV\HDU¶V$XWXPQ6WDWHPHQWKDGLPSRUWDQW
LPSOLFDWLRQVIRUWKH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶V%XGJHW
± DQGVHWVWKHVFHQHIRUWKH)LQDQFH6HFUHWDU\¶V
statement on the 15th December.  
Under the new fiscal framework, the Scottish 
budget now depends upon a complex mix of grant 
from Westminster and devolved tax revenues.  
Prior to the Autumn Statement, there was 
considerable uncertainty as to what the Chancellor 
may choose to do to departmental spending 
across the UK ± and therefore what this may might 
mean for the Scottish block grant.  
In the end, he chose to largely follow the plans of 
his predecessor George Osborne ± which implies 
DFXWWR6FRWODQG¶V%ORFN*UDQWRIDURXQG
between 2016-17 and 2020-21. 
7KHH[DFWVL]HRI6FRWODQG¶V%XGJHWZLOOQRZDOVR
depend upon how well Scottish tax revenues 
SHUIRUP$V&KDUWKLJKOLJKWVLI6FRWODQG¶VWD[
revenues grow more quickly than in the rest of the 
UK ± as they have done on average since 
devolution ± the Budget will be larger than it would 
have been without tax devolution (and vice versa).  
6FRWODQG¶V%XGJHWRXWORRNZLOORIFRXUVHDOVR
depend upon the tax policy choices of the 
government ± which based on the SNP manifesto 
amount to around £200 million by 2020-21 on 
devolved taxes on top of £100 million from 
changing council tax bands.  
)DUJUHDWHUDUHWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VVSHQGLQJSODQV
Taking just pre-announced commitments in health, 
police and childcare for example, implies real-
terms cuts of between 10-13% by 2020-21 for 
µXQSURWHFWHGDUHDV¶ 
The Chancellor did announce a further boost to 
capital investment ± a cumulative £800 million of 
new consequentials between 2016-17 and 2020-
&RXSOHGZLWK6FRWODQG¶VQHZERUURZLQJ
powers of £450 millLRQSHUDQQXP6FRWODQG¶V
capital budget could be back above 2010-11 levels 
for the first time by 2020-21.  
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Chart 18: Scottish Economic Performance ± lagging the 
UK 
 
 Source: Scottish Government 
 
 
Chart 19: Challenges in manufacturing linked to North 
Sea ± sustained falls in output since 2014 
 
 
Source: Scottish Government
 
 
Chart 20: Drivers of Quarterly Change ± Services making 
greatest contribution to overall growth 
 
 
Source: Scottish Government
 
 
 
Recent Scottish economy data 
The most recent official data on the Scottish 
economy covers the period to June 2016.  
It shows that the Scottish economy returned to 
growth ± with output up 0.4% in Q2, an 
improvement on the -0.0% in Q1.  
Underlying growth is likely to have been stronger. 
Longannet power-station closed in March and 
reduced output by approximately 0.2%.   
However, the gap between Scotland and the UK 
continues.  
Manufacturing grew 0.8% over the quarter but 
remains down 3.6% over the year and over 5% 
since early 2015. The sectors most directly tied to 
the downturn in the North Sea remain weak. 
Construction continues to return to more normal 
levels. As we highlighted in July, according to the 
official statistics, construction grew by 35% 
between Q2 2013 and Q2 2015. Setting aside any 
concerns about the data, growth of this scale 
cannot continue indefinitely. Unsurprisingly 
construction fell 3.0% in Q1 and 1.9% in Q2. 
Thirdly, the all-important services sector continued 
to grow and was the key driver of the change in 
output. Q¶VILJXUHRIFRPHVRQWKHEDFNRI
growth of 0.5% in Q1 2016.  
Finally, on closer inspection, we find that ± in 
addition to Longannet ± two sectors had a 
disproportionate impact on the quarterly results.  
Firstly, the Professional, Scientific, Administrative 
& Support Services sector grew 3.6% in the 
quarter. 
Secondly, there was a (huge) 7% increase in the 
output of the Water Supply & Waste Management 
sector in Q2. This is a very small component of the 
overall economy (just 1.3% of total output) so 
normally changes here have little impact on the 
overall rate of growth.  
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Chart 21: Expenditure components of nominal GDP ± 
households remain most important factor  
 
Source: Scottish Government 
 
 
Chart 22: Investment back at pre-financial crisis levels in 
Scotland  
 
Source: Scottish Government & Fraser of Allander Calculations
 
 
Chart 23: Savings Ratio continues to fall with the ratio 
slightly lower in Scotland than in the UK as a whole  
 
Source: Scottish Government & Fraser of Allander Calculations
 
 
But on this occasion and taken together, these two 
sectors contributed around 0.5% to the overall 
growth rate of the whole Scottish economy ± so in 
effect, without these volatile sectors, growth would 
have been virtually flat (or negative) once again. 
The Quarterly National Accounts for Scotland 
publication shows that investment (Gross Fixed 
Capital Formation) was the main contributor to Q2 
growth - up 5.2% in nominal terms from the first 
three months of the years. As Chart 22 shows, 
investment in Scotland had been lagging behind 
the rest of the UK recently, but has been growing 
more quickly in recent months.   
Whilst the contribution from net trade was positive 
during the quarter, this was only the second time in 
the last six quarters where it boosted rather than 
contracted output. Manufacturing exports are down 
5% on the year.  
2YHUDOO6FRWODQG¶VGHFOLQLQJH[SRUWSHUIRUPDQFHLV
of considerable concern and a key challenge for 
policymakers.  
Growth in household spending remains ± on 
balance ± the most consistent driver of growth in 
the Scottish economy.  
,QWHUHVWLQJO\6FRWODQG¶VHVWLPDWHGVDYLQJUDWLR
remains much lower than for the UK. If this reflects 
some households using up savings in order to 
support consumption, and this is before inflation 
increases and employment prospects become 
more uncertain, then it may not bode well for future 
growth prospects.  How this interacts with current 
relatively high levels of household indebtedness 
will be worth watching.  
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Chart 24: Employment & Unemployment: Jul-Sep 2016 
 
Source: ONS, Labour Force Survey 
 
 
Chart 25: Inactivity Rates: change over year 
 
Source: ONS, Labour Force Survey 
 
 
Chart 26: Changes for Men and Women: Last 18 months 
 
Source: ONS, Labour Force Survey 
 
 
 
The Scottish labour market 
Our new report ± Scottish Labour Market Trends ± 
aims to provide a detailed quarterly discussion of 
developments in the Scottish labour market.  
This highlighted that on most headline indicators, 
6FRWODQG¶VODERXUPDUNHWFRQWLQXHVWRSHUIRUP
relatively well in what continues to be a 
challenging economic environment.  
6FRWODQG¶VXQHPSOR\PHQWUDWHLVRQFH
again lower than that for the UK (4.8%).  
Although it has slipped back slightly over the past 
18 months, employment in Scotland remains close 
to record highs.  
However, some of these more positive statistics 
hide a number of more challenging trends. In 
particular, the recent sharp fall in unemployment 
appears to stem, not from people finding work, but 
from people leaving the labour force.  
Indeed, whilst unemployment has fallen by 38,000 
over the year, employment actually fell by 12,000 
(both 16+). At the same time, inactivity increased 
by around 54,000 (16-64).  
Inactivity rates had been relatively stable since the 
end of 2012, but they have increased over the past 
18 months.  
Women account for much of the rise. The increase 
in female inactivity of over 50,000 (16-64) 
coincides with falling unemployment (-19,000) and 
employment (-32,000) (both 16+) over the past 18 
months. This could, in part, be driven by a 
reversion to trend. Female inactivity had been 
falling up until the start of 2015.  
Interestingly, a similar result is evident in the rate 
of underemployment in Scotland.  
Underemployment in this context refers to the 
proportion of people, in work, who would like to 
work longer hours than they currently do at the 
same rate of pay. Whilst it has fallen back to 2011-
12 levels, underemployment remains much higher 
than before the 2008-09 financial crisis.  
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Em
plo
ym
e
nt
 
Ra
te
 
(%
 
16
 
-
64
)
Un
e
m
pl
o
ym
e
nt
 
Ra
te
 
(%
 
16
+
)
Unemployment
Employment
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
England Wales N. Ireland Scotland UK
Ch
a
ng
e
 
in
 
Ra
te
 
(%
 
po
in
t)
-40,000
-30,000
-20,000
-10,000
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
Employment Unemployment Inactivity
Ch
na
ge
 
fro
m
 
e
nd
 
o
f Q
1 
20
15
Men Women
Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary, December 2016  
17 
 
Chart 27: Underemployment (hrs) rate: 07-08 to 15-16  
 
Source: ONS, Annual Population Survey 
 
 
Chart 28: Hours Worked & full-time share pre-recession 
average: 07-08 to 15-16  
 
Source: ONS, Annual Population Survey 
 
 
Chart 29: Productivity levels in Scotland remain weak 
 
Source: Scottish Government 
 
 
 
A feature of recent years has been an increasing 
more to part-time employment. Indeed over the 
past decade, over two thirds of the growth in total 
employment has been in part-time work.  
Of those in part-time work, around 1 in 7 indicate 
that the key reason that they took such work is that 
they cannot find full-time work (up from 1 in 10 a 
decade ago).  
Concerns about the number of people in 
temporary work have gained attention in recent 
months. 1 in 3 temporary workers currently say 
that the main reason they are in such employment 
is because they cannot find permanent work, up 
from 1 in 4 a decade ago.  
Moreover, not only is the share of employment that 
is full-time lower than its pre-financial crisis 
average, mean hours worked are also lower.   
Taken together, these indicators suggest that the 
rapid rise in employment, which has been a key 
feature of the Scottish labour market in recent 
times, may be masking underlying challenges in 
terms of the type of employment being created.   
Productivity in Scotland has barely improved since 
2010 ± although it has fared slightly better than the 
UK as a whole.  
7KHSUHFLVHFDXVHVRIWKLVµSURGXFWLYLW\SX]]OH¶
remain a mystery, although there have been plenty 
of explanations proposed ± including low levels of 
investment in the public and private sectors, 
limited investment in R&D and innovation, poor 
DFFHVVWRILQDQFHLQKLELWHGµFUHDWLYHGHVWUXFWLRQ¶
processes as a result of financial sector 
restructuring, and the nature of recent 
technological developments.  
If Scotland is to meet the challenges of Brexit, then 
tackling this relatively weak performance ± and its 
drivers such as a lower propensity to export and 
internationalise, poor levels of investment, lower 
innovation etc. ± will be key. 
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Chart 30: Consumer Confidence in Scotland and the UK  
 
Source: GfK 
 
 
Chart 31: Inflation key driver of confidence in Scotland. 
&RPSDUHGWRODVW\HDUGR\RXWKLQNSULFHVZLOO«  
 
Source: GfK
 
 
Table 8: Permanent Staff Placements: 2016 
 µQRFKDQJH¶ Scotland  UK 
Jul 47.1 45.4 
Aug 53.3 51.1 
Sep 55.2 51.0 
Oct 49.8 54.6 
Source: IHS Markit
 
 
Table 9: PMI Scotland and the UK 
 µQRFKDQJH¶ Scotland  UK 
Jul 49.2 47.3 
Aug 49.1 53.1 
Sep 51.2 53.8 
Oct 50.6 54.6 
Source: IHS Markit
 
Outlook  
$VLQWKH8.6FRWODQG¶VLPPHGLDWHHFRQRPLF
outlook will largely be shaped by the prospects for 
household spending.  
In general, there has been a gradual easing in 
levels of consumer confidence in Scotland. The 
market research GfK index (where 0 = balance) 
was -9 in November, implying consumers are 
pessimistic about the outlook.  
Unsurprisingly, the prospects for higher inflation 
DUHEHJLQQLQJWRZHLJKRQSHRSOH¶VPLQGVZLWKDQ
increasing number of consumers expecting prices 
to rise rapidly through the course of 2017.   
$XVHIXOµVRIW-LQGLFDWRU¶IRUODERXUPDUNHW
conditions is the IHS Markit Jobs Report. August 
and September were strong months ± and better 
than the UK ± but October saw falls in both 
permanent and temporary posts.  
Wider business surveys also paint a mixed picture.  
The IHS Markit PMI for Scotland has been 
relatively weak since mid-2015. It indicated that 
output contracted marginally in July and August, 
but bounced back in September - driven by the 
sharpest increase in new business intakes since 
August 2015 ± before slipping a little in October.  
Overall, the PMI has showed a weaker economic 
performance in Scotland than for the UK as a 
whole even before the EU referendum.  
The latest RBS Scottish Business Monitor for Q3 
2016 did contain some evidence of resilience in 
the Scottish economy over the summer ± fuelled 
by a boost in tourism.   
33% of firms reported an increase in the volume of 
business, compared to 30% who witnessed a fall. 
A similar split was found in terms of expectations 
for the next six months.  
The North East continues to lag Scotland as a 
whole with 40% of respondents reporting falling in 
business activity.  
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Chart 32: RBS/FAI Business Monitor shows mixed 
signals 
 
Source: Fraser of Allander/RBS Scottish Business Monitor
 
 
Table 10: Latest Nowcasts for Q3 and Q4 for Scotland 
 Q3 Q4 
Quarterly Growth 0.32% 0.37% 
Annualised Growth 1.28% 1.50% 
Source: Fraser of Allander 
 
 
Chart 33: Oil and Gas optimism 2010-2016: Still negative 
but picking up from record lows 
 
Source: Fraser of Allander/Aberdeen Grampian Chambers 
Commerce 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Similar results were found in the latest Scottish 
Chambers of Commerce survey ± with relatively 
fragile levels of performance and optimism in most 
sectors.  
To make better sense of all this, and to provide an 
up to date assessment of the performance of the 
Scottish economy, we produce a monthly 
µQRZFDVW¶RITXDUWHUO\JURZWK
www.fraserofallander.org.  
In estimating our nowcasts, we make use of a wide 
variety of different data sources, including the 
latest business surveys and up-to-date information 
RQ6FRWODQG¶VODERXUPDUNHWDQGRWKHULQGLFDWRUV 
On balance, our nowcasts suggest that going on 
the available suite of current evidence, the Scottish 
economy has continued to grow at a relatively 
stable (but slow) pace through the second half of 
2016. Combined with published data for the first 
six months of the year, this points to growth of 
around 1% for the year as whole.  
As in recent Fraser Economic Commentaries, the 
outlook for Scotland will depend markedly upon 
the prospects for the oil and gas sector.  
We are now entering the third year of the current 
low oil price cycle. Investment has fallen around 
40% from its 2014 peak and exploration levels 
remain low, with only six exploration wells spudded 
so far this year. Oil and Gas UK estimates that the 
sector is now supporting around 120,000 fewer 
jobs across the UK supply chain than it did just two 
years ago. 
There are some signs however, that the 
restructuring in the sector may have helped 
mitigate ± at least in part ± recent declines.  
Business confidence remains negative but has 
stabilised relative to recent record lows.  
Our judgement is that the outlook for the North 
Sea is slightly more positive ± or at least less 
negative ± than in July and this provides a modest 
positive uplift to our forecasts for the overall 
Scottish economy since July.  
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Chart 34: Scottish and UK output per head ± Scotland 
behind UK recently but gap not as stark as for total GDP  
 
Source: Fraser of Allander 
 
 
Table 11: Changing labour market measures: last 12 
months 
 Employment 
Rate  
Unemployment 
Rate 
Inactivity 
Rate 
Scotland 73.6% -0.6% 4.7% -1.3% 22.6% +1.6% 
UK 74.5% +0.7% 4.8% -0.5% 21.7% -0.3% 
Source: ONS, LFS
 
 
Chart 35: Wages, employment and tax revenues per 
capita, Scotland as % of UK  
 
Source: Fraser of Allander 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Outlook for Scottish tax revenues 
A number of tax revenues and powers are in the 
process of being transferred to the Scottish 
Parliament.  
Most notably, revenues from Non-Savings Non-
Dividend income tax is being devolved in time for 
April 2017, together with the ability to vary rates 
and thresholds. 
Under the new fiscal framework, the size of the 
Scottish budget will now depend on how well 
Scottish devolved taxes per head fair relative to 
their equivalent counterparts in the rest of the UK 
(rUK). If they grow at the same rate, the Scottish 
budget will be no better or worse off than it would 
have been without tax devolution.  
However, even small differences in relative tax 
growth could equate to large budgetary effects 
over the course of several years. For example, if 
per capita Scottish tax revenues grew just 0.35 
percentage points more slowly than in the rUK per 
annum, this could leave the Scottish budget 
smaller by £250m in 2020 relative to what would 
have been the case under Barnett.   
Output per head provides a useful proxy for 
relative performance but the key drivers of income 
tax revenues will be the employment rate and 
growth in wages.  
$V KLJKOLJKWHG SUHYLRXVO\ 6FRWODQG¶V HPSOR\PHQW
has been weaker than for the UK as a whole over 
the past 12 months. 
During the past two years, the median wage of 
Scottish workers has also grown more slowly than 
the median wage of rUK workers. 
What is arguably more important than median 
wages for income tax revenues is the wage growth 
of higher income earners, as they contribute a 
disproportionate amount of income tax.  
Here, between 2015 and 2016 wage growth at the 
90th percentile in Scotland grew at half the rate of 
the 90th percentile in rUK (1.3% v. 2.7% 
respectively). 
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 Table 12: Median (full-time) gross weekly earnings 
 Scot UK CPI 
 Earnings  change Earnings change  
2014 £519.60 2.1% £518.3 0.2% 1.8 
2015 £527.00 1.4% £527.1 1.7% -0.1 
2016 £535.00 1.5% £538.7 2.2% 0.3 
Source: ONS, ASHE 
 
 
Chart 36: Oil and gas contractor average pay: 2014-2016  
 
Source: Fraser of Allander/Aberdeen Grampian Chambers 
Commerce
 
 
Chart 37: Interaction devolved/reserved policy 2017-2018  
 
Source: Fraser of Allander 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One explanation is the downturn in the offshore 
economy. Median wages declined by 5% in 
Aberdeen and 4% in Aberdeenshire between 2015 
and 2016. In the latest FAI/AGCC survey, the 
median average change in pay in the last year 
within the sector was -4.5%. The first time in the 
history of the survey that firms reported an 
average pay reduction. 
It remains to be seen whether these recent trends 
of relatively slower growth in Scottish employment 
and wages continue. If they do, the Scottish 
economy will do well to match the rUK in terms of 
revenue growth per capita for devolved and 
assigned taxes. The Scottish Government is due 
to publish forecasts for tax revenues in its Draft 
Budget on 15th December.  
The Scottish Government may also choose to 
change tax policy. Two major policies have been 
announced for next year ±  
i) to freeze the higher rate threshold in real 
terms and then increase it by no more than 
inflation until 2021-22; and,   
 
ii) to alter the multipliers on council bands E-H, 
raising around £100m for education 
attainment.   
 
The policy to freeze the higher rate threshold (the 
rate at which people start paying tax at 40p) 
amounts to a tax rise for Scottish higher rate 
taxpayers relative to their rUK counterparts. The 
Scottish Government had estimated that the policy 
would raise around £130 million next year, but 
higher inflation is likely to reduce that revenue to 
around £100 million ± assuming CPI is used.  
A quirk of the policy is that higher rate taxpayers in 
Scotland will face a combined income tax and 
National Insurance marginal tax rate of 52% on 
income between the Scottish and rUK high rate 
thresholds (i.e. between approx. £43,500 and 
£45,000). This is because the upper earnings limit 
for national insurance (which remains reserved to 
Westminster) drops from 12% to 2% when 
earnings move into the (rUK) higher income tax 
threshold.  
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Down > 10% Down > 5% but <10% Down 0% to 5% No change Up 0% to 5% Up >5% but <10% Up >10%
%
 
o
f r
e
s
po
n
de
n
ts
2014
2015
2016
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
55%
0  10,000  20,000  30,000  40,000  50,000  60,000
M
a
rg
in
a
l T
a
x 
Ra
te
s
Income Tax National Insurance Combined Rates
Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary, December 2016  
22 
 
Table 13: Latest growth forecasts for the UK economy  
 2017 2018 2019 
Bank of England 1.4 1.5 1.6 
OBR 1.4 1.7 2.1 
NIESR 1.4 2.2 2.3 
European Commission 1.0 1.2 n/a 
IMF 1.1 1.7 1.8 
Oxford Economics 1.4 1.2 1.5 
ITEM Club 0.8 1.4 1.6 
CBI 1.3 1.1 n/a 
Source: HM Treasury 
 
 
Table 14: FAI forecast Scottish GVA growth (%) 2016 to 
2019 
 
2016 2017 2018 2019 
GVA 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.6 
Production 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.8 
Construction 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Services 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.5 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute 
 
 
Chart 38: Growth to remain below trend through forecast 
 
 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute 
 
* Actual data to 2015, central forecast with forecast uncertainty for 
2016 ± 2019 
Uncertainty bands sourced from accuracy of past forecasts 
 
 
 
 
Our forecasts 
Forecasting short-term growth in an uncertain 
environment is always a challenge.   The aftermath 
of the EU referendum is a perfect example ± and 
there is a divergence of opinion over the outlook. 
As in past Commentaries, we report a central 
forecast but use estimated uncertainty bands to 
set out a likely range within which we predict 
Scottish GDP will lie. In our view, and in the 
current uncertain climate, it is this range that 
should be the central focus of discussion rather 
than specific point estimates.  
In other words, it is entirely possible that the 
Scottish economy could grow close to its trend of 
2% in 2017 and 2018 ± as Chart 38 highlights ± 
but our assessment is that the probability of that 
happening is lower than for our central projection. 
The greatest judgement call concerns the timing of 
any Brexit induced impacts. At the time of writing, 
there are significant uncertainties not only in terms 
of the negotiated settlement but the extent of any 
transitional deal or when Article 50 is triggered.  
Given the data this year so far, coupled with our 
emerging nowcasts, we have kept our forecast for 
2016 relatively constant ± up +0.1% to 1.0%.  
The next 3 years ± 2017, 2018 & 2019 
Our central forecast is for growth to remain at 
broadly the same pace in 2017 ± with growth of 
1.1% (up on our July forecast of 0.5%). This is a 
revision of around +0.15% per quarter.  
This, in part, reflects our expectation that the 
strength of the UK economy over the past year ± 
and better forecast outlook ± will exert a positive 
influence in the near term. We are also slightly less 
pessimistic in terms of the outlook for the North 
6HDWKDQLQ-XO\DQGEHOLHYHWKDW$XJXVW¶V
innovative funding scheme from the Bank of 
England will support lending into next year.   
The prospects for DWUDQVLWLRQUDWKHUWKDQµFOLII-
HGJH¶%UH[LWDOVROHDGVXV± on balance ± to 
predict a slightly better outlook for 2017 and 2018.  
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Table 15: FAI revised forecast %-point change from pre-
Referendum forecast by sector, 2016 to 2018 
 
2016 2017 2018 
GVA -0.4 -0.8 -0.7 
Production -0.4 -0.8 -0.7 
Construction -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 
Services -0.3 -0.7 -0.7 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
 
 
Chart 39: Contribution to forecast ± slowdown in 
investment and consumption but pick-up in net trade 
 
 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute 
 
 
Table 16: FAI labour market forecast to 2019 
 
2017 2018 2019 
Employee Jobs 2,467,200 2,505,200 2,543,150 
% employment 
growth over year 1.2 1.5 1.5 
ILO 
unemployment 151,100 155,750 166,400 
Rate (%)1 5.6 5.7 5.9 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute 
Notes:  
Absolute numbers are rounded to the nearest 50.  
1
 Rate calculated as total ILO unemployment divided by total of 
economically active population aged 16 and over. 
 
 
 
 
 
These upward revisions need to be put in context. 
Our pre-referendum forecasts were for growth in 
2017 and 2018 of 1.9% and 2.0% respectively.  
Our revised growth projections remain well below 
these levels. Compared to trend growth rates, 
annual growth of 1-1½% is equivalent to a loss of 
around £5 billion by the end of 2019.   
Growth across all sectors is likely to be relatively 
fragile. And output in particular quarters could be 
close to 0 ± making a short technical recession 
possible. Construction will be particularly weak, in 
part due to its continued return to trend following 
strong growth in 2014-15.  
On the components of demand, we expect the 
short-term uncertainty, financial instability, higher 
risk premiums and challenges in the housing 
market, to hit investment over the next three years. 
Consumption will likely start to weaken next year 
as higher inflation, combined with low earnings 
growth, feeds through to household spending.  
Net exports will continue to benefit from the 
depreciation in the pound as will sectors such as 
tourism (though retail could be hit hard).  Whether 
Scottish exporters are in the position of being able 
to take advantage of this competitive boost is open 
to question.  
We expect unemployment to rise gradually toward 
6%.There remains a degree of volatility in the 
labour market data which may materially impact on 
these forecasts.  
Back in July we forecast unemployment could rise 
to 6.5% in 2016. Instead it stands at 4.7%. But this 
fall in unemployment is not from people finding 
work but from people moving into inactivity.  
As discussed in our Labour Market Trends report, 
if the sharp rise in inactivity had instead translated 
into higher unemployment, for the same level of 
employment, 6FRWODQG¶VXQHPSOR\PHQWUDWHZRXOG
now be around 6.3% - close to our July forecast.  
To the extent that any of this rise in inactivity is 
UHYHUVHG6FRWODQG¶VXQHPSOR\PHQWUDWHFRXOGULVH
much more sharply than predicted.  
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Policy context 
 
/DWHURQWKLVZHHN6FRWODQG¶VQHZ)LQDQFH
Minister will set out his first Draft Budget ± the first 
ZLWK6FRWODQG¶VQHZLQFRPHWD[SRZHUV 
This follows major policy interventions by both the 
Bank of England and the UK Government.  
7KH%DQN¶VVWLPXOXVLQ$XJXVW- which included a 
cut in interest rates, further Quantitative Easing 
and a scheme to boost cheap funding for 
businesses and households ± was bolder than 
many had anticipated. It is likely that the Bank is 
near its limits in terms of the support it can provide, 
particularly with the likelihood of a sharp rise in 
inflation in the coming months.  
,QODVWPRQWK¶V$XWXPQ6WDWHPHQWWKH8.
Government chose neither to inject a major 
stimulus into the economy nor to increase the pace 
of austerity.  
7KH&KDQFHOORU¶VIRFXVLQVWHDGFHQWUHGXSRQ
longer-term policies to boost productivity ± 
including a new National Productivity Investment 
Fund which aims to add £23 billion of spending to 
housing, roads, digital infrastructure, and science 
and technology by 2021-22. The intention is to 
DFKLHYHDµVWHS-FKDQJH¶LQSURGXFWLYLW\:KHWKHULW
is possible to achieve a step-change with 
investment equivalent to 0.25% of GDP remains to 
be seen. 
The Scottish Government is likely to be under 
pressure to announce similar productivity 
enhancing initiatives in its Budget, particularly in 
the light of the weaker growth performance in 
Scotland over the past year.  
But the Finance Secretary has little room to spare. 
As discussed in our 6FRWODQG¶V%XGJHW 
report, major spending pressures in areas such as 
health, childcare and the public sector pay bill will 
constrain the resources at his disposal to boost the 
economy.  Furthermore, recent challenges in 
education standards may mean that any money 
that can be freed up is targeted here rather than 
elsewhere.  
The Scottish GoverQPHQW¶VPLOOLRQ*URZWK
Fund does provide an opportunity to support new 
private investment and the Budget should set out 
further detail on how it will operate. The 
reclassification of a number of major infrastructure 
projects ± including the Aberdeen Western 
Periphery Route ± DVEHLQJµRQEDODQFHVKHHW¶ZLOO
however, hit levels of capital investment compared 
to original plans.   
Overall, the Scottish Government is unlikely to 
announce any major departures from existing 
policies. With that in mind, it is absolutely vital that 
the government set out its multi-year spending 
plans as soon as possible. It is simply not credible 
to continue to rely on one-year settlements.  
Which brings us to Brexit.  
Much of the debate, thus far, has understandably 
been on quantifying the potential scale of the 
challenge. Our own modelling ± which accounts for 
exports and imports changing and supply chain 
effects through the rest of the UK ± estimates that 
output will be lower in the long-run.  
Trade opens up businesses to new opportunities 
for exporting and investment; labour mobility 
boosts labour supply helping to increase 
productivity and address demographic challenges 
in countries ± such as Scotland ± with an ageing 
population; competition helps efficiency, product 
specialisation and growth; and financial integration 
deepens and broaden capital markets. 
Where policy can now have an influence is on the 
scale of any impact, which, in turn, depends 
crucially upon the terms of the exit deal and what 
both the Scottish and UK Governments do to 
address the challenges that will then follow. 
$VZHPRYHFORVHUWRWKH8.¶VH[LWIURPWKH(8
therefore, it is essential that discussions now focus 
on the practicalities of what Brexit might mean for 
businesses, sectors and individuals.  
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In our view, this should include ± 
i. Understanding the trade-offs from the 
specific terms of the negotiated exit from the 
EU; 
 
ii. Identifying the sectors and areas of the 
economy ± e.g. international investment, the 
labour market, regional growth etc. ± most 
likely to be impacted by Brexit; 
 
iii. The policy opportunities that may open up ± 
both at the Scottish and UK level ± from no 
longer being bound by EU commitments and 
obligations; and,  
 
iv. Reassessing existing policy priorities and 
commitments, and crucially the delivery of 
WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V(FRQRPLF6WUDWHJ\LQD
world where Scotland is no longer part of the 
EU. 
None of this will be easy. And even with strong 
policy responses and a good outcome in the 
negotiations, the economy will still face headwinds. 
Whilst it is understandable that the debate thus far 
has focussed on the scale of the impact of Brexit, 
the political fall-out from the referendum campaign, 
and the potential constitutional implications both in 
Scotland and the UK, it is critically important that 
our policymakers now move quickly to find 
solutions and develop strategies to respond to the 
challenges (and new possibilities) that Brexit 
presents. 
Here lies an opportunity, albeit one created out of 
difficulty rather than success. Many of the 
challenges that Scotland will face in a world where 
the economic environment will ± as a result of 
Brexit ± be more growth-inhibiting rather than 
growth-supporting ± have been around for 
decades. 
:HNQRZWKDWZHPXVWLPSURYH6FRWODQG¶VH[SRUW
performance, boost levels of innovation in our 
economy (both in R&D and also in work 
environments), re-balance the industrial structure 
of our economy, focus on long-term value added 
rather than short-term profit, provide greater 
opportunities for all of Scotland to benefit from 
growth, and build an economy that tackles poverty 
and poor quality work. 
Brexit will not make any of this easier, far from it. 
But with the right ambition and focus within policy 
circles there is an opportunity to use the challenge 
thrown down by Brexit to take a fresh look and, 
perhaps undertake a more honest assessment, at 
KRZEHVWWRDGGUHVV6FRWODQG¶VORQJHUWHUP
economic challenges (and to take advantage of 
new opportunities that will emerge) in the years 
ahead. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For regular analysis on the Scottish economy and public finances please see our blog: 
www.fraserofallander.org 
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7RZDUGVDµ6FDQGLQDYLDQPRGHO¶IRU6FRWODQG 
Tobias Emonts-Holley, Alastair Greig, Patrizio Lecca, Katerina Lisenkova, Peter G McGregor. J Kim 
Swales 
 
1. Introduction and background 
 
The fiscal powers of the Scottish Government have recently been significantly enhanced as a 
consequence of the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  Scotland Act 2012, which required the Parliament 
to set a Scottish Rate of Income Tax (SRIT) from April 2016. The SRIT can vary from that in the rest 
of the UK by up to 10p in the pound.  More extensive powers over income tax will come into effect in 
April 2017 as a consequence of the Scotland Act 2016, which sought to implement the proposals of the 
Smith Commission (2014). The Scottish Government will then gain the power to set income tax 
rates and thresholds (but not personal allowances). All income tax receipts on wage income 
collected in Scotland will be received by the Scottish Government, with a corresponding 
adjustment in the block grant, as detailed in the new Fiscal Framework (2016). These changes 
will make Scotland one of the most powerful devolved governments in the world in terms of the proportion 
of public spending and tax revenues under its control, although there of course remains a debate about 
how effective these new powers are and whether or not they go far enough. 
 
While there has been considerable debate about which tax powers should be devolved, there has been 
much less discussion on what should be done with the powers once they are devolved. Differences in 
income tax policy among Scottish political parties did emerge during the recent Scottish Parliament 
elections. The Scottish Government has, for example, decided not to fully HPXODWHWKH8.*RYHUQPHQW¶V
recent decision to increase the threshold for higher rate tax payers, which will create the first income tax 
differential between Scotland and the rest of the UK (RUK). 
 
The recent increase in the degree of fiscal autonomy is of a scale that could allow for more radical change 
in the structure of the Scottish economy and the nature of Scottish society if so desired. The current 
Scottish Government seems likely to continue with gradual changes in tax policy at least in the short-run. 
However, a number of prominent SNP members have argued for a bolder approach1.  It seems likely that 
over time there will be growing pressure on future Scottish administrations to consider more distinct 
income tax policies, although they will remain nervous about the possible reaction of Scottish taxpayers. 
 
7KH ³6FDQGLQDYLDQ PRGHO´ KDV RIWHQ EHHQ KHOG XS DV RQH WKDW 6FRWODQG LI LW KDG WKe necessary fiscal 
powers, might wish to emulate, although the emphasis has typically been on the high level (and quality) of 
public services rather than the associated high level of taxation that characterizes the Scandinavian 
economies. In fact, even the income tax powers devolved in April 2016, as a consequence of the Scotland 
Act 2012, would allow the Scottish Government to raise average income tax rates to Scandinavian levels 
and use the revenues to implement a substantial increase in public spending. This paper explores the 
                                                          
1
 For example MacAskill (2016) DUJXHVWKDW³5DWKHUWKDQUXQQLQJDZD\IURPWKLVWKH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQWVKRXOG
HPEUDFHLW7KHUH¶VDEHWWHUZD\WRUXQDVRFLHW\SD\LQFROOHFWLYHO\IRUJUHDWHUHIILFLHQF\DQGDYDLODELOLW\IRUDOOVKRZthe 
VRUWRIVRFLHW\ZHFRXOGUHDOO\EH,W¶VWKHSULFHRIEHLQJ6FRWWLVK´ 
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likely consequences of such a shift as a contribution to our understanding of the likely impact of Scotland 
pursuing a differentiated income tax policy from that in RUK. It will be critical for any future Scottish 
Government that might contemplate the use of significant differential income taxes to carefully assess the 
likely implications for the Scottish economy and society. 
 
The next section begins by identifying some key characteristics of the Scandinavian economies, and 
how income tax in Scotland would need to adjust in order to move toward a more Scandinavian 
taxation regime.  This is followed by a discussion of the results simulating the impact of a substantial 
increase in income taxation using the Fraser RI $OODQGHU ,QVWLWXWH¶V &RPSXWDWLRQDO *HQHUDO (TXLOLEULXP
(CGE) model.  
2. 7KH³6FDQGLQDYLDQPRGHO´ 
 
Keating and Harvey (2014) identify two ideal-type contrasting strategies for dealing with globalization and 
other changes: market liberalism, associated inteUDOLDZLWK WKH%DOWLF6WDWHVDQG WKH ³VRFLDO LQYHVWPHQW
state, in which public expenditure is seen as a contribution to the productive economy rather than a drain 
RQLW´RSFLWSVRPHWKLQJDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKH6FDQGLQDYLDQHFRQRPLHV,QWKLVPRGHl, the role of the 
state is much more prominent and instrumental than in other Western economies. 
Apart from the higher tax and spend dimension of the Scandinavian economies, there are also important 
institutional differences from the UK, which are crucial to the way that these states operate. For example, 
WKH ³WULSDUWLWH EDUJDLQLQJ´ V\VWHP LQ WKH 6FDQGLQDYLDQ HFRQRPLHV LV FKDUDFWHULVHG E\ QDWLRQDO ZDJH
QHJRWLDWLRQVZKLFKLQFOXGHWUDGHXQLRQVHPSOR\HUV¶DVVRFLDWLRQVDQGWKHJRYHUQPHQW)XUWKHUWKLVV\VWHP 
is subject to an annual  bargaining cycle,  which is believed  to reduce tensions in the negotiations that are 
commonly observed in other European economies, for example in Germany (Keating & Harvey, 2014; 
Financial  Times,  2015). A second institutional GLIIHUHQFHLVUHIOHFWHGLQWKHSULQFLSOHRI³XQLYHUVDOLVP´7KLV
concept embraces all citizens such that the middle-class is included in the benefit system. Through the 
inclusion of most of society in the social system, solidarity is better ensured, and provides political support 
for the system to thrive (Keating & Harvey, 2014).    
Acemoglu et al  DUJXH WKDW WKH VXFFHVV RI WKH 6FDQGLQDYLDQ PRGHO LV DWWULEXWDEOH WR ³FXGGO\
FDSLWDOLVP´ZKLFKIUHHULGHVRQD³FXWWKURDWFDSLWDOLVP´VXFKDVWKDWH[SHULHnced in the US) and helps to 
SXVKRXW WKHZRUOG¶V WHFKQRORJ\ IURQWLHU%DUWKHW DO DUJXH WKDW WKH VXFFHVVRI WKH6FDQGLQDYLDQ
economies in terms of economic growth, high productivity, low wage dispersion/inequality and a big 
welfare state reflects what is, in effect, a two-level bargaining system.  A local system supplements the 
national system described above and strong trade unions both suppress wage dispersion and enhance 
local productivity. The latter is generated through inducing greater worker effort and higher capital 
investment. Furthermore, the wage compression and productivity enhancement encourage political 
support for welfare spending.  
It is clear that simply raising income taxes to Scandinavian levels and using the resultant revenues to 
LQFUHDVH FXUUHQW JRYHUQPHQW VSHQGLQJ LV LQVXIILFLHQW WR HPXODWH WKH ³6FDQGLQDYLDQ PRGHO´ LQVWLWXWLRQDO
differences are also central. The analysis that follows here focusses solely on the valuation of government 
expenditures by workers in the Scottish laboXU PDUNHW DQG WKH HIIHFW WKDW KDV RQ 6FRWODQG¶V
macroeconomic performance. 
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3. Towards a Scandinavian model through an income tax adjustment 
 
So what would be the likely consequences of a Scottish Government moving towards the Scandinavian 
model by significantly raising the income tax rate and recycling the revenues to expand current 
government expenditure?  For simplicity, it is assumed that the increase in government expenditure is 
entirely a demand-side stimulus in current expenditure, with no significant changes to the welfare system 
or any immediate supply-side impact beyond the creation of a local amenity. In principle, only allowing 
6FRWODQG WR PRYH WRZDUG D ³6FDQGLQDYLDQ PRGHO´ WKURXJK DGMXVWPHQWV LQ WKH 6FRWWLVK LQFRPH WD[ UDWH
rather than spreading the burden across a range of taxes, is problematic. However, Kleven (2014) does 
suggest that the tax burden in Denmark, Sweden and Norway disproportionately falls on personal income 
taxes. This implies that the Scottish Government would likely have to significantly increase labour taxes, 
including income tax, to emulate the Scandinavian case. Table 1 provides 2013 OECD statistics on the 
total tax wedge2 as a proportion of total labour costs for an average, unmarried Scandinavian and British 
worker with no children.  
 
Table 1: Average personal income taxes as a proportion of labour costs, 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD 
We now consider the likely impact of a fiscal expansion in Scotland, where only changes in income tax 
revenues are recycled to augment current government expenditure. In conceptually similar balanced 
budget fiscal expansions, two countervailing forces are generated (Lecca et al, 2014).  
 
There will be a net stimulus to demand: a balanced budget expansion essentially shifts spending from 
private to public consumption. However, the negative impact of the fall in private consumption due to the 
rise in income taxation, is more than offset by the positive stimulus generated by the expansion in 
government expenditure, since the latter is less import-intensive.  
The second is a negative competitiveness effect: if taxes rise workers feel worse off and attempt to restore 
their real consumption wages through increased wage claims. The nature and scale of the 
competitiveness effect depends critically on migration and wage bargaining behaviour. 
 
                                                          
2
 7KH2(&'GHILQHVWKHWRWDOWD[ZHGJHDV³7KHFRPELQHGFHQWUDODQGVXE-central government income tax plus 
employee and employer social security contribution taxes, as a percentage of labour costs defined as gross wage 
earnings plus HPSOR\HUVRFLDOVHFXULW\FRQWULEXWLRQV7KHWD[ZHGJHLQFOXGHVFDVKWUDQVIHUV´
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TABLE_I5  
 
% of average labour costs 
Denmark 36.4% 
Finland 43.1% 
Iceland 34.1% 
Norway 37.3% 
Sweden 43.0% 
United Kingdom 31.4% 
Scandinavian Average 38.8% 
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We consider three alternative wage bargaining regimes. In the Conventional Macro case, neither local 
residents nor potential migrants place any value on the increase in public consumption following the fiscal 
expansion and standard specifications of the migration function and bargained real wage curves apply, 
with  after tax real consumption wages governing both migration and bargaining decisions. This means 
that at any given employment rate, the nominal wage will have to rise by the amount required to offset the 
rise in the tax rate and the increase in the CPI to ensure zero net migration.  
 
Also in this case, workers bargain for a net of tax real wage, and there is upward pressure on wages 
and prices that creates an adverse competitiveness effect, as workers seek to restore their real take 
home pay. The more open the economy, in terms of share of imports and responsiveness to relative price 
changes, the greater the adverse demand effects associated with the loss of competitiveness. Given that 
migration is assumed to respond only to the net of tax real wage and unemployment differentials in this 
case, a predominant adverse competitiveness effect means that, real post tax wages initially fall, 
unemployment rises and net out-migration occurs until the real wage and unemployment rates are 
restored (at lower levels of population and employment).   
 
In microeconomic models of fiscal federalism (e.g. Tiebout, 1956), potential migrants value the 
increase in public services provided by the relevant authority and factor that into their migration 
decisions. This is the basis of the Conventional Micro model, in which we assume that migrants are 
motivated by their µVRFLDO wDJH¶ZKLFKZHWDNHWREHXQDIIHFWHGE\WKHEDODQFHG-budget fiscal expansion: 
migrants value the increased public spending equally to the r e d u c e d  private wage resulting from the 
income tax increase. However, this valuation is not reflected in regional wage bargaining. The long-
run equilibrium where the nominal wage increases (but not sufficiently to restore the real wage), and the 
employment (unemployment) rate falls (rises). While the unemployment rate rises in this case, the extent 
of the adverse supply shock is less than under the Conventional Macroeconomic case, with nominal 
wages rising less, so that employment and GDP effects are improved and any induced net out-
migration reduced. 
 
Finally, consider the Social Wage case in which the increase in public consumption is valued equally to 
the loss in private consumption. In the long-run the nominal wage and employment rate are unaffected. 
This reflects the fact that workers value the increase in government consumption as much as their 
foregone private consumption, so that they feel as well-off after the change as they did before. 
Accordingly, workers do not push to restore their take-home wage following the policy change, and the 
adverse competitiveness effect is eliminated completely. In this case, therefore, the beneficial net demand 
stimulus associated with the fiscal expansion predominates, and output and employment expand, in a 
manner similar to that envisaged in the simple Keynesian balanced budget multiplier. However, the whole 
of the increase in tax (and induced effects on the CPI) is reflected in a significant reduction in the post-tax 
wage. 
 
4. Simulation results 
 
We run three simulations using the )UDVHU RI $OODQGHU ,QVWLWXWH¶V $026 $ 0DFUR-micro model Of 
Scotland) model. This is a regional CGE model (Lecca et al 2014, 2016) calibrated on the 2013 Scottish 
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SAM (Emonts-Holley et al, 2014). We simulate the impact of a balanced budget fiscal expansion that 
raises the average Scottish income tax rate to bring its tax wedge into line with the Scandinavian average, 
from UK levels reported in Table 1. This would require the Scottish Government to implement a 7.4 
percentage point increase in the average income tax rate (or a 42% increase). The first column of Table 2 
reports results for the Conventional Macro model. In this case, neither potential migrants nor workers value 
public consumption. Accordingly, migrants respond to the net of tax real wage, as do workers who seek to 
restore the initial value of their real take home pay (and, in the long-run  succeed in doing so).  Therefore 
there is no change in the post-tax real wage or in the unemployment rate in the long run. While public 
expenditure rises by 11.5%, the long run impact of the fiscal expansion is contractionary, with a fall of 
6.5% in Gross Regional Product (GRP) and around 7% in employment. It is clear that, for Scotland, the 
adverse competitiveness effect of the fiscal stimulus dominates the net stimulus to demand, reflecting the 
degree of openness of the Scottish economy, with exports to both RUK and ROW falling by over 6%. 
 
Table 2: The long-run impact of a 42% increase in the average income tax rate 
  
Conventional Macro Conventional Micro Social Wage 
Change in Income Tax Rate 7.4 pp 7.4 pp 7.4 pp 
GRP Income measure -6.54% -5.90% 1.93% 
Consumer Price Index 3.93% 3.62% 0.00% 
Unemployment Rate 0.00% 7.81% 0.00% 
Total Employment -6.86% -6.13% 2.97% 
Nominal Gross Wage 15.87% 14.55% 0.00% 
Nominal Wage after Tax 3.93% 2.75% -10.31% 
Real Gross Wage 11.49% 10.55% 0.00% 
Real Wage after Tax 0.00% -0.85% -10.31% 
Labour Income 7.92% 7.53% 2.97% 
Capital Income -2.90% -2.63% 0.54% 
Labour Force  -6.86% -5.66% 2.97% 
Households Consumption -3.99% -3.99% -3.90% 
Government Consumption 11.47% 11.87% 16.75% 
RUK. Export -6.04% -5.59% 0.00% 
ROW Export -6.19% -5.73% 0.00% 
 
The adverse competitiveness effect is apparent in the substantial rise in the nominal gross wage (of 16%) 
and the CPI (around 4%), as workers successfully restore the initial value of their real take home pay.  Due 
to the zero net migration condition, which is binding over the long run, the unemployment and real wage 
rates are ultimately restored to their initial values through a process of net outmigration. The rise in the 
average rate of income tax naturally lowers household consumption, in this case by 4% in the long-run.   
The second column in Table 2 reports the long-run results for the Conventional Micro model.  Here 
potential migrants value the increase in public consumption, but workers do not moderate their wage 
claims accordingly. Typically, Conventional Micro models abstract from the presence of imperfect 
FRPSHWLWLRQLQODERXUPDUNHWVVRWKDWWKHLPSURYHGDPHQLW\LVDQH[WHUQDOLW\IURPWKHLQGLYLGXDOZRUNHU¶V
perspective. The fiscal expansion results in a rise in public consumption of nearly 11.5% in the long run, 
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but GRP falls by 6%, and employment by 6%. Given the predominant adverse competitiveness effect 
observed in the Conventional Macro model, the scale of the resultant contraction in this case is less.  As 
before, in the short-run real wages fall and the unemployment rate rises, inducing net outmigration. 
However, the scale of the response is now less than before since migrants are, in effect, motivated by the 
Social Wage in Scotland, not by the net of tax wage. Accordingly, migration does not continue until real net 
of tax wages and unemployment rates return to their initial levels. While workers continue to attempt to 
restore their real wage, this increases the unemployment rate and lowers their bargaining power. A lower 
real take home wage rate is now compatible with the zero net migration equilibrium, given that potential 
migrants value the higher Social Wage in Scotland. 
Workers are in this case unable to restore fully their net take home pay, although the pressure on wages 
remains significant, with the nominal gross wage rising by 14.5%.  Essentially, labour supply remains 
higher in this scenario than in the Conventional Macro case because migrants are less willing to move out 
of Scotland at any given net of tax real wage, and so the upward pressure on the real wage due to 
outmigration is less in this case. Consequently, the change in the unemployment rate is also positive in the 
long run (it increases by 8%).    
Overall, the aggregate results of the Conventional Macro and Micro models are very similar, reflecting the 
predominance of adverse competitiveness effects in both cases, although the behaviour of the real wage 
and unemployment rates differs, reflecting the different models of migration embedded within them. 
However, the results of the Social Wage model, summarised in the last column of Table 2, are very 
different from both Conventional models. In this case, workers do not bargain to restore their take-home 
wage, since the increase in government expenditure compensates them for the reduction in t pay and nor 
do migrants require compensation for lower pay. Ultimately, neither the nominal wage nor the employment 
(or unemployment) rate change.  However, we know that in this case there is no adverse supply effect, 
and so the (net) stimulus to demand predominates. Here the balanced budget  fiscal expansion produces 
a rise of 17% in government consumption in the long run and generates a rise in GRP of around 2% and in 
employment of nearly 3%. 
Since workers do not seek to restore their net take home pay there is no upward pressure on the nominal 
wage or the CPI in the long run.  The real wage after tax therefore experiences a substantial fall of 
approximately 10% in the long-run. Due to this fall and the tax hike, household consumption declines by 
4% in this case. The shift from private consumption to government demand transfers expenditure to labour 
intensive sectors, such as education and health, which accounts for the rise in employment exceeding that 
in GRP). Exports are unchanged in the long-run as the competitiveness of the region is ultimately 
unaffected.  
The social wage model effectively eliminates any adverse supply shock associated with the fiscal stimulus, 
by preventing any upward pressure on the nominal wage. However, this implies a willingness by workers 
to accept a substantial cut, of nearly 10%, in their real take home pay.  In the long-run this model operates 
³DVLI´LW LVDQLQSXW-output system, in which the supply side is entirely passive and wages and prices are 
unaffected. We obtain results very similar to simple Keynesian balanced-budget multipliers, which are 
positive, although here both population and capital stocks are endogenous. 
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It is clear that the overall impact of this balanced budget fiscal expansion is crucially dependent on the 
SXEOLF¶V YDOXDWLRQ RI WKH DPHQLW\ DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK WKH JUHDWHU SXEOLF H[SHQGLWXUH DQG HVSHFLDOO\ WR WKH
H[WHQWWRZKLFKWKLVLVUHIOHFWHGLQZRUNHUV¶ZDJHEDUJDLQLQJEHKDYLRXU 
5. Conclusions 
 
Scotland is in the process of acquiring very substantial powers over income tax, extending well beyond the 
ability to change the Standard Variable Rate by plus or minus three pence in the pound, which 
accompanied the establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999. Currently, the Scottish Government 
has to set a Scottish Rate of Income Tax (SRIT), and its powers are due to be significantly enhanced when 
the provisions of the Scotland Act (2016) are implemented from 2017.  Of course, it would always be 
possible to set a SRIT to ensure that, overall, income tax rates are equal to those in RUK so as to maintain 
the status quo, and this was indeed what happened when the rate was first set in 2016. However, 
differences in tax policies began to emerge in the 2016 Scottish Parliamentary elections; now only the 
Conservatives remain committed to the maintenance of income tax parity with the rest of the UK.  
This paper explores the likely impact of a radical shift in the direction of the Scandinavian model, 
characterised by high taxes and high public spending, a shift made feasible by the enhanced fiscal 
autonomy that Scotland now enjoys. The main message from our analysis is that the nature of the wage 
bargaining system will likely have a crucial determining role in the macroeconomic outcome of a significant 
hike in income taxes and public spending. If the public amenity created by higher public spending is not 
valued by Scottish workers or migrants to Scotland, and bargaining is not restricted by weak labour market 
conditions, the openness of the Scottish economy is likely to result in a fiscal expansion having 
contractionary aggregate effects. If, on the other hand, the higher public spending is valued as much as 
the forgone private consumption, and this is reflected in workers effectively bargaining over the Social 
Wage, there is no adverse competitiveness effect, and the result is a modest expansion in economic 
activity. 
The Social Wage outcome is, however, necessarily associated with a significant fall in real take home pay, 
and the key question is how likely it is that Scottish workers would be willing to accept that in return for the 
maintenance or enhancement of public services. The current wage bargaining system in Scotland seems 
unlikely to deliver Social Wage outcomes, at least over the longer term. Accordingly, our results suggest 
that, if a move towards Scandinavian levels of public services and taxes was judged to be appropriate, it 
would be essential to seek reform of the bargaining system if adverse macroeconomic consequences were 
to be avoided. Alternatively, some form of incomes policy linked to the provision of public services might 
be pursued. 
Of course, the case we consider here ± of an immediate hike in taxes to Scandinavian levels - is 
unrealistic in that any move in that direction would likely be much more cautious and gradual. But it seems 
doubtful that ad hoc agreements linking moderated wage responses to incremental increases in public 
VSHQGLQJ IRU SDUWLFXODU SXUSRVHV ZRXOG EH IHDVLEOH ZLWKLQ 6FRWODQG¶V ODERXU PDUNHW +RZHYHU LW VHHPV
likely that trDGHXQLRQZRUNHUV¶DWWLWXGHVWRLQFUHDVHGSXEOLFVSHQGLQJZLOOGHSHQGRQWKHFRPSRVLWLRQRI
that spending. US evidence suggests that spending on health and education has a positive effect, but 
spending on welfare has a negative impact on working migrants.  
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While the Scandinavian model has often been held up as an example that Scotland might wish to emulate, 
few have advocated the kind of radical change considered in this paper. However, public attitudes may 
shift toward more radical taxation policies given increasing pressure on the budgets available for public 
spending. In any event, it will remain important for Scottish governments of whatever hue to understand 
the likely effects of any deviation from income tax parity with RUK. Without such an understanding there 
can be no appreciation of the potential costs and benefits of maintaining the status quo, as against 
alternative policies. While we have begun to address this issue here, there are a number of aspects that 
need to be more thoroughly explored in future research, using more realistic scenarios. 
We have considered only one, radical, option facing the Scottish Government from April 2016. It would be 
useful to investigate the use of the new tax powers to move towards the low tax/ low public spending 
associated with the Baltic economies, although this is a shift that few in Scotland have advocated. Here 
whether increased competitiveness effects are likely to stimulate the economy will again depend on the 
valuation of any change in public spending, and the extent to which that is reflected in the wage bargaining 
system. 
There is also a need to explore the valuation of public spending more systematically, in particular its 
dependence on the composition of government spending, and on the source of that spending, in terms of 
the level of government.  There is requirement for a better understanding of any immediate supply-side 
consequences of changes in government spending. This is perhaps most obviously relevant when we 
consider government capital expenditure, but would also apply to those aspects of current government 
spending, which in fact represent investment in human capital and so would also be expected to have 
important supply-side impacts (e.g. Hermannsson et al, 2014). The presence of such a stimulus introduces 
a beneficial supply-side stimulus that tends to counter the negative competitiveness effects, but the former 
takes time to emerge. Such changes might therefore continue to have adverse macroeconomic 
consequences even in the medium run in the absence of Social Wage bargaining (Lecca et al, 2015) or 
sources of nominal wage inflexibility. This timing of effects could lead policy makers to lay undue emphasis 
on the short-to-medium term outcomes and this may act to inhibit investments in physical and human 
capital that are worthwhile from a longer term perspective.  
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)LVFDOGHYROXWLRQDQG6FRWODQG¶VFLWLHVµGRXEOH
GHYROXWLRQ¶DQGRSWLPLVLQJXUEDQLQYHVWPHQW 
Prof Greg Clark, Jonathan Couturier, Emily Moir and Dr Tim Moonen  
 
Abstract 
6FRWODQG¶V FLWLHV DUH WKH SRZHUKRXVHV RI WKH 6FRWWLVK HFRQRP\  7R EH VXFFHVVIXO DQG SURYLGH WKH
employment, housing and social needs of their citizens, they require sustainable and sufficient resources 
to enable them to invest in the infrastructure ± transport, environment, employment and skills ± that 
supports success and adaptation. This article outlines examples, drawn from OECD countULHV¶
H[SHULHQFHVWKDWSURYLGHDZLGHUFDQYDVVWRWKLQNDERXWIXWXUHUHIRUPVIRU6FRWODQG¶VFLWLHVWKDQGRWKH
City Deals architecture of applied to English cities. 
Key words: Cities, Scotland, fiscal devolution, OECD city reforms  
 
1. Introduction -  Scotland, cities, investment and prosperity 
Cities around the world, including in Scotland, demonstrate a strong and enduring link between the rate of 
investment and urban prosperity. The scope of a city to invest in productive infrastructure, skills, land 
redevelopment, and R&D is essential to its ability not only to deliver services but also to shape and 
manage population and economic change. This challenge is especially important given the growing role of 
cities in national economies, including Scotland.  The seven largest cities in Scotland currently generate 
DURXQGRIQDWLRQDO*9$RI WKHQDWLRQ¶V MREVDQGSRVWDQGFRQWLQXH WRDEVRUE WKHPDMRULW\RI
population growth.  
At key points in their development, cities are exposed to gaps between their investment needs and the 
capital they generate or attract. Cities all over the world have seen this gap grow in the aftermath of the 
global financial crisis. When an investment deficit like this persists over several cycles, cities can find 
themselves stuFNLQZKDWZHPLJKWFDOODµORZ-investment, low-UHWXUQ¶HTXLOLEULXPWKDWHURGHVTXDOLW\RIOLIH
DQG SURGXFWLYLW\ DQG FDQ µORFN LQ¶ D QHJDWLYH SDWK WKDW LV GLIILFXOW WR FRUUHFW WKLQN RI 'HWURLW 5RPH RU
Athens). This then further constrains resources available from revenues or transfers to invest either in the 
infrastructure that underpins long-term prosperity, or in the projects that bring about necessary change.3  
One result of this investment deficit is the increasing attention given to creative fiscal reforms and financing 
solutions that enhance the self-funding capacity of cities, local governments and metropolitan areas. The 
OECD observes a strong correlation between fiscal decentralisation, prosperity and productivity, such that 
doubling the sub-national share of public spending is associated with an average 3% increase in GDP per 
capita.  If sub-national authorities have more control over the finances, this increases the rate of return on 
that capital. 
There is also mounting evidence that fiscal devolution - or financial empowerment of cities - large and 
small, rich and poor - creates an incentive framework that ultimately improves the economy, productivity 
                                                          
3
 www.scottishcities.org.uk/site/assets/files/1221/foa_-_scotland_27s_economic_powerhouses_-_28-10-15_1.pdf  
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and service standards.4 Lower tiers of government, it seems, work harder to improve their performance 
when they are more dependent on the resources that they generate directly. Across the world cities are 
negotiating with higher tiers of government for the reforms that will recognise their investment 
requirements and enable them to retain and capture more of the economic growth they generate. 
 
Table 1: Fiscal empowerment of sub-national tiers of government in selected OECD countries5 
 Sub-Central Tax 
Revenue as % of total 
revenue* 
Inter-governmental 
transfer revenue as % 
of total revenue**  
Region / Local Tax 
revenue as % of total 
revenueq  
Austria Region: 1.6% 
Local:  3.2% 
Region: 82.0% 
Local: 62.3% 
Region: 46.5% 
Local: 66.0% 
Belgium Region: 5.3% 
Local: 5.0% 
Region: 64.5% 
Local: 47.2% 
Region: 15.5% 
Local: 31.4% 
Denmark Local: 26.7% Local: 58.8% Local: 33.8% 
Finland Local: 23.2% Local: 29.7% Local: 45.4% 
Norway Local: 12.1% Local: 45.0% Local: 37.8% 
United Kingdom Local: 4.8% Local: 68.1% Local: 13.3% 
*2011 figures; ** 2014 figures; q2012 figures 
Source: OECD Fiscal Decentralisation Database.  
 
7KLVSDSHUH[DPLQHV WKHSRWHQWLDOEHQHILWV IRU6FRWODQG¶VFLWLHVRI WKH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQWSXUVXLQJDQ
HQKDQFHGPRGHORIILVFDORUµGRXEOHGHYROXWLRQ¶WR6FRWODQG¶VFLWLHVDVWKH\HQWHUDQHZF\FOHRIJOREDOO\-
oriented development in a post-Brexit era. There are many examples and models from which they can 
draw inspiration and practical lessons.  
2QH SRVVLELOLW\ LV IRU 6FRWODQG¶V FLWLHV DQG 6FRWWLVK 3DUOLDPHQW WR ORRN WR (QJODQG ZKHUH D GLVWLQFWLYH
µHDUQHGDXWRQRP\¶PRGHORIGHYROXWLRQLVXQIROGLQJWKURXgh the City Deals process. 
But, there is also a great deal to be learnt from the experience of cities elsewhere, especially in countries 
(more) similar in size to Scotland such as Belgium, Chile, Finland and New Zealand. In absorbing some of 
their importanWOHVVRQVWKLVSDSHUSODFHVWKHFXUUHQWRSSRUWXQLW\IRU6FRWODQG¶VFLWLHVLQDEURDGHUFRQWH[W 
2. 6FRWODQG¶VFLWLHV± ILVFDORU³GRXEOHGHYROXWLRQ´" 
 
)URP WKH SHUVSHFWLYH RI H[WHUQDO DQG FRPSDUDWLYH REVHUYHUV LW LV FOHDU WKDW 6FRWODQG¶V FLWLHV KDYH
achieved a great deal since the painful and protracted process of de-industrialisation and wider economic 
change triggered by globalisation began over 50 years ago. The extent of physical, economic, 
                                                          
4
 http://people.uta.fi/~atmaso/verkkokirjasto/Second_tier_cities_policy.pdf; www.slu.cz/opf/cz/informace/acta-
academica-karviniensia/casopisy-aak/aak-rocnik-2015/docs-2-2015/Szarowska.pdf; 
https://feb.kuleuven.be/drc/Economics/misc/eibtrans/files/federalism-infrastructure-presentacio-soleolle.pdf  
http://ftp.aefweb.net/WorkingPapers/w592.pdf; www.iadb.org/en/news/news-releases/2016-05-23/fiscal-
decentralization-in-latin-america,11467.html; www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/28927/impact-fiscal-
decentralization.pdf 
5
 www.oecd.org/ctp/federalism/oecdfiscaldecentralisationdatabase.htm#A_1  
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GHPRJUDSKLFDQGFXOWXUDOFKDQJH LQ6FRWODQG¶VFLWLHV LVSrofound. In many cases the transformation has 
given confidence not only to the larger cities of Edinburgh and Glasgow, but also to Aberdeen, Dundee, 
Inverness, Perth and Stirling and others, to explore new opportunities, and now begin to advocate for new 
tools to manage their urban and metropolitan growth.6 
It is worth recalling that there have been at least ten important dimensions to this transformation of 
6FRWODQG¶VFLWLHVIURPDQµRXWVLGHLQ¶SHUVSHFWLYH 
i. Renewal and modernisation of physical fabric. FoUPRUHWKDQ\HDUV6FRWODQG¶VFLWLHVKDYH
successfully reclaimed and redeveloped land in and around their city centres in order to improve 
their commercial and tourist attractiveness. Physical regeneration has become a centrepiece of 
wider city strategies, and continues to account for at least £3 billion of investment across Dundee, 
Edinburgh and Glasgow alone.  
One of the most important examples is, of course, the regeneration of the River Clyde corridor and 
Glasgow, which has seen the greatest concentration in urban investment in Scotland, ranging from major 
projects such as the Scottish Exhibition and Conference Centre (and SSE Hydro Arena), Glasgow Science 
&HQWUH %%& 6FRWODQG 679 WR WKH (PLUDWHV $UHQD DQG DWKOHWH¶V YLOODJH IRU WKH  *ODVJRZ
Commonwealth Games.  In addition, the creation of Glasgow International Financial Services District 
(IFSD) at the Broomielaw is testament to the successful investment in new sectors to diversify the 
Glasgow economy.   
Aberdeen, Dundee and Edinburgh, among others, continue to regenerate strategically located but under-
used land, including waterfronts (with a £1bn project in Dundee), bus depots, brewery sites and gas works, 
that have all significantly improved the appetite for city centre living and working.7  
ii. More diversified and innovative economies. Upgrade of the physical fabric has enabled 
6FRWODQG¶VFLWLHV WRDWWUDFWDQGQXUWXUHQHZVHFWRUV WKDW DUHPRUHSURGXFWLYHDQG UHVLOLHQW7KH
International Financial Services District (IFSD) has helped Glasgow to provide the floor plates and 
Class A space necessary to attract and accommodate a range of financial companies, while 
spending on R&D activities in the city has more than doubled since 2009. In Dundee, District 10 
now sustains creative industries in place of mucKRIWKHSUHYLRXVPDULWLPHDFWLYLWLHV$EHUGHHQ¶V
professional, scientific and technical sectors have more than tripled their output since 1998 as 
they feed off the success of the oil and gas sector.  
$FURVVPRVWRI6FRWODQG¶VPDMRUFLWLHV WKHVKDUHRIRXtput of ICT, professional and advanced services, 
business support, real estate, and life sciences have grown by 70%-200% over the past 20 years - 
VXSSRUWHGE\RXWVWDQGLQJXQLYHUVLWHV6FRWODQG¶VFLWLHVKDYHODXQFKHGRYHUµVSLQ-RXW¶DQGVWDUW-up 
companies since 2000, more than any other UK region, with especially high growth in Aberdeen. Overall, 
                                                          
6
 http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/56260/ 
7
 www.glasgow.gov.uk/CHttpHandler.ashx?id=17548&p=0; www.glasgowcanal.co.uk/about-the-canal; 
www.glasgow.gov.uk/index.aspx?articleid=16166; http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/56260/; www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
scotland-scotland-business-37213627; www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jul/20/commonwealth-games-glasgow-
regeneration; www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ef11690e-3075-11e5-91ac-a5e17d9b4cff.html; www.dundeewaterfront.com/; 
ZZZ6FRWODQG¶VSROLF\QRZFRXNDUWLFOHGXQGHH; 
www.budgepr.com/LatestNews/NewsArticleTemplate/tabid/90/itemid/44/amid/516/waterfront-regeneration-adds-billions-
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Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary, December 2016  
39 
 
*9$ JURZWK LQ PDQ\ RI 6FRWODQG¶V FLWLHV KDV RXWSHUIRUPHG WKDW RI WKHLU 8. FRXQWHUSDUWV RXWZLWK RI
London.8  
iii. New connective infrastructure. Neighbourhood revitalisation has been accompanied by 
sustained infrastructure investment that has seen Edinburgh create its first tram line, the 
modernisation of the Glasgow Subway, and Aberdeen will benefit from near £1 billion investment 
in road, rail and education infrastructure in recent years.  The European Investment Bank (EIB) 
KDVDOVREHHQDPDMRU LQYHVWRU LQ6FRWODQG¶V FLWLHV IXQGLQJXQLYHUVLWLHV HJ7KH7HFKQRORJ\	
Innovation Centre (TIC) at the University of Strathclyde), energy infrastructure, and transport 
projects (e.g. a new deep water port in Aberdeen). Investment in smart cities and digital projects 
KDVDOVRSLFNHGXSIROORZLQJWKH6FRWODQG¶V*RYHUQPHQW¶VGLJLWDOVWUDWHJ\9  
iv. Strong business and civic leadership networks. The wider system of leadership in 6FRWODQG¶V
cities has evolved to become professional and effective advocates for their cities. Glasgow 
Economic Leadership has brought together leaders from the business, public and academic 
VHFWRUVDQGZDVLQVWUXPHQWDOLQEDFNLQJWKHFLW\¶V&LW\'HDODPELWLRQVDQGVSRQVRULQJWKHFLW\¶V
new Economic Strategy.  The Edinburgh Business Forum (formerly Edinburgh Business 
Assembly), the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce and Aberdeen & Grampian Chamber of 
Commerce have become active partners in city governance.10 In 2011, the Scottish Cities 
Alliance was set up as an investment coordination and promotion agency, collaborating with 
6FRWODQG¶V VHYHQ FLWLHV DQG WKH 6FRWWLVK *RYHUQPHQW 7KLV PRUH GLVWULEXWHG PRGHO RI FLW\
governance has increased the speed and efficacy with ZKLFK 6FRWODQG¶V FLWLHV DGGUHVV WKHLU
immediate and longer-run challenges. 
v. Improved skills7KHHFRQRPLFWUDQVLWLRQRI6FRWODQG¶VFLWLHVKDVEHHQDFFRPSDQLHGE\DVKDUS
increase in workforce skills. Between 2004 and 2014, Glasgow, Edinburgh and Aberdeen have 
seen between 10% and 13% increases in their working age population with qualifications at 
(S)NVQ 4 and above ± IDVWHUWKDQPRVW8.¶VFRUHFLWLHVVDYH/RQGRQ7KHSDVWGHFDGHKDVDOVR
seen an impressive 15-18% increase in human capital working in science and technology sectors 
across Edinburgh, Aberdeen and Glasgow. The latter now has over 135,000 students, five higher 
education institutions and three super colleges, while Dundee has the highest student to 
population ratio in Scotland. Based on international rankings, the university system across 
6FRWODQG¶VOHDGLQJVHYHQFLWLHVLVRQHRIWKHVWURQJHVWLQDQ\VPDOOQDWLRQLQWKHZRUOG11  
vi. Increased business friendliness and business confidence. City indices data indicate that 
6FRWODQG¶V FLWLHV KDYH EHFRPH highly regarded for their investment openness, business 
                                                          
8
 http://labs.lsecities.net/eumm/m/metromonitor#7/55.634/-3.214; 
www.dundeewaterfront.com/zones/seabraes/district10; www.scottishcities.org.uk/site/assets/files/1221/foa_-
_scotland_27s_economic_powerhouses_-_28-10-15_1.pdf; www.centreforcities.org/data-tool/  
9
 http://news.scotland.gov.uk/News/-254-million-boost-to-Aberdeen-21f0.aspx; ZZZ6FRWODQG¶VFLties.org/smartcities/; 
www.eib.org/infocentre/press/releases/all/2016/2016-150-eib-agrees-new-investment-totalling-eur-7-4-billion-including-
eur-3-billion-for-clean-transport-energy-smes-and-innovation-under-investment-plan-for-europe.htm; 
www.spt.co.uk/subway/modernisation/; www.scdi.org.uk/policy/projects  
10
 http://glasgoweconomicleadership.com/overview/glasgow-economic-commission/; http://investglasgow.com/; 
www.marketingedinburgh.org/about-us/; www.ed.ac.uk/news/2016/eib-230216; www.edinburghbusinessforum.co.uk/ ; 
www.eib.org/infocentre/press/releases/all/2016/2016-049-eib-to-outline-new-innovation-financing-for-6FRWODQG¶V-
companies-and-announce-record-university-investment.htm  
11
 www.scottishcities.org.uk/site/assets/files/1223/city_key_facts_-_march_2016.pdf; Times Higher Education, Shanghai 
Jiao Tong and QS university rankings 2016.  
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friendliness and the strength of their foreign investment strategies since the financial crisis. 
6FRWODQG¶VWKUHHODUJHVWFLWLHVRXWSHUIRUPWKHLUVL]HWRUHJXODUO\DSSHDULQDVVHVVPHQWVRIWKHWRS
European cities for overall investment prospects. Aberdeen in particular has surged since 2011 to 
join the overall European top 25, while Edinburgh and Glasgow are noted for their support to 
EXVLQHVVHV WRVHWXSDQGH[SDQGDQGD µFDQ-GR¶ OHDGHUVKLS WKDW UHJDrds business as a trusted 
partner.12  
vii. New governance ethos, partnerships and alliances. 6FRWODQG¶V FLWLHV KDYH LQFUHDVHG WKHLU
propensity to work horizontally with other municipalities in their wider region, and with other 
parties such as infrastructure proYLGHUV XQLYHUVLWLHV DQG WUDGH XQLRQV 6FRWODQG¶V FLW\ OHDGHUV
have become more recognised for their vision and professionalism, while the formulation of 
longer-term, multi-sector and multi-cycle plans in cities such as Glasgow, Dundee and Edinburgh 
marks a step up in strategic thinking and partnership-building.13 
viii. Proven hosting of catalytic events. &RQILUPHG E\ *ODVJRZ¶V KRVWLQJ RI WKH &RPPRQZHDOWK
*DPHV LQ  DQG WKH DQQXDO (GLQEXUJK )HVWLYDOV 6FRWODQG¶V FLWLHV DUH QRZ HVWDEOLVKHG DV
strong event destinations in Europe. The most recent data shows that both Glasgow and 
Aberdeen have seen an increase in the number of rotating international meetings and events 
since 2012.  Glasgow in particular has broken into the global top 50 and the Hydro Arena is now 
a Global Top 3 arena.  And Edinburgh is now among the top 35 meetings destination cities in 
Europe.14 
ix. Improved city promotion and visibility. 7KH LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHFRJQLWLRQRI6FRWODQG¶V FLWLHVKDV
soared in recent years, with tourist growth comfortably outpacing that of English cities (bar 
London). Edinburgh hosted over 1m international visitors in 2015, for instance, an 11% increase 
on the previous year. Glasgow saw a nearly 16% increase ± ZKLOH 6FRWODQG¶V FLWLHV PDNH XS
WKUHHRI WKH8.¶V WRSYLVLWRUGHVWinations. Edinburgh is now in the global top 10 position on 
some reputation rankings. Overall since 1998, total nights spent by tourists in accommodation for 
the NUTS 2 regions of Scotland have soared by 600,000 in the Glasgow region, 1.4 million in the 
Edinburgh, Stirling and Perth region, and 1.4 million in the Aberdeen region.15   
x. Higher quality of life. The cumulative effect of these changes has been a clear overall 
LPSURYHPHQW LQ OLYHDELOLW\ 7KH (8¶V VXUYH\ RQ TXDOLW\ RI OLIH VDZ *ODVJRZ¶V RYHUDOO UHVLdent 
satisfaction surge from 84% to 95% from 2009 to 2015 ± ZKLOH 6FRWODQG¶V FLWLHV DUH UHJXODUO\
rated among the most liveable in the UK.16 This marks a significant change from the high point of 
de-population, unemployment and disadvantage in the 1970s and 1980s. 
6FRWODQG¶VFLWLHVKDYHGHPRQVWUDWHGEH\RQGDQ\TXHVWLRQWKHLUFDSDFLW\IRUVXVWDLQHGLPSURYHPHQWDQGIRU
professional and consistent management of assets, opportunities and resources.  
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 www.fdiintelligence.com/Rankings/European-Cities-and-Regions-of-the-Future-2016-17  
13
 www.gov.scot/Publications/2016/03/3178  
14
 www.iccaworld.com/newsarchives/archivedetails.cfm?id=5756  
15
 ZZZGDLO\UHFRUGFRXNQHZV6FRWODQG¶V-news/scotland-enjoying-tourism-boom-three-8123903  
16
 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database; www.centreforcities.org/data-tool/#graph=map&city=show-
all&indicator=working-age-population-with-a-qualification-at-nvq4-or-above\\actual\\2004--2014; 
http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http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/studies/pdf/urban/survey2015_en.pdf; 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/studies/pdf/urban/survey2009_en.pdf  
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3. A national Cities Policy in Scotland? 
 
The multi-IDFHWHG HYROXWLRQ RI 6FRWODQG¶V FLWLHV KDV SURPSWHG QHZ QDWLRQDO DSSURDFKHV WR WKH XUEDQ
agenda. The Scottish Government recently launched its renewed Agenda for Cities, an update of its 2011 
position that rests on four foundations: increasing internationalisation of the urban economy, boosting the 
investment rate, boosting innovation, and supporting inclusive growth.  
,QSDUWLFXODUWKLVVWUDWHJ\SODFHVDELJIRFXVRQ6FRWODQG¶V&LW\5HJLRQVDVWKHDSSURSULDWHVFDOHDWZKLFK
resources can be pooled, and functional economies harnessed.17 In the first years of its 2011 iteration, this 
agenda successfully brought into being the Scottish Cities Alliance which helped to  drive more effective 
collaboration between the cities, and advocacy at the national level.  It also saw the development of a £10 
billion investment prospectus for six of the seven city regions.  It was during this period that Glasgow 
developed the Glasgow and the Clyde Valley City Deal, the first City Deal in Scotland.  This was a bold 
initiative that drew in support from the Westminster and Holyrood governments, and that was announced 
prior to the Scottish independence referendum in September 2015.  
The national cities agenda in Scotland promises greater government support for investment promotion at 
the level of the city region by running more investor events, attracting investment from sovereign wealth 
IXQGVDQGVWUHDPOLQLQJWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VLQWHUIDFHZLWKLQYHVWRUV,WDOVRDLPVWRDOLJQFLW\QHHGVZLWKZLGHU
national cross-sectoral investment strategies (rather than silo them), and looks at applying Tax Increment 
Financing (TIF) and other schemes. At the same time the Scottish Government is looking to improve 
business and city access to technology and big data to get smart city projects off the ground. All in all, 
WKHUH LV D FOHDU VWHS FKDQJH WRZDUGV HPSRZHULQJ WKH FLW\ UHJLRQDO VFDOH DQG HQVXULQJ WKH 6FRWODQG¶V
government works more effectively for its major growth engines.  
City Region Deals  
$NH\SDUWRIWKH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VQHZ agenda is its agreement to further City Region Deals, which 
began with Glasgow and then expanded to Aberdeen, Inverness and most recently Stirling. These Deals 
offer central government (Scottish and UK) funding for key projects that are collaboratively designed and 
agreed by the local authorities spanning each city region. Each deal is different:18  
x The Glasgow and Clyde Valley City Deal, signed in 2014, commits funding of £500m over 20 
years from both the UK and Scottish governments to the City Deal that iVPDQDJHGE\WKHDUHD¶V
eight local authorities. It will support a £1.13bn infrastructure investment fund, and help leverage 
a further £3bn of private sector investment. In addition to 20 major infrastructure and employment 
projects, the Deal provides support to the local life sciences cluster, and business innovation ± 
with decisions taken by a dedicated Glasgow City Region Cabinet.19  
x The Aberdeen City Deal is based on a 50:50 funding formula that will see the Scottish 
Government allocate 50% of funding on specific projects, with total support worth £250m over 10 
years. The Deal explicitly facilitates further development of oil extraction in the North Sea, 
supports the Port of Aberdeen, and offers a further £254m in funding towards local infrastructure 
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 www.gov.scot/Resource/0049/00495349.pdf  
18
 www.gov.scot/Topics/Built-Environment/Cities  
19
 www.glasgowcityregion.co.uk/article/7621/How-will-the-City-Deal-work  
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projects requested by local authorities. Projects are managed and determined by a Joint 
Committee made of up local authorities and business stakeholders.20 
x And the Inverness City Deal, signed in March 2016, commits £315m over a 10 year period ± 
including support for improved transport links, digital connectivity, and skills. It is estimated that it 
will attract around £1bn in private sector investment, in addition to the public funds.21   
In each case, these negotiated Deals could have an important impact in increasing urban productivity, and 
increasing the culture of partnership and innovation in these three city regions. These are the first steps 
WRZDUGVDPRUHµPDQDJHGPHWURSROLV¶EXWPDQ\PRUHVWHSVUHPDLQ 
4. The next 20 years - ZKDWZLOO6FRWODQG¶VFLWLHVQHHG? 
 
$V ZH FDQ VHH IURP WKH UDQJH RI LQLWLDWLYHV DQG SURMHFWV QRWHG DERYH 6FRWODQG¶V FLWLHV QRZ ILQG
themselves in a new redevelopment path since de-industrialisation; this is especially true for Glasgow and 
Dundee.  Their successful economic restructuring is one that is familiar to many globalising small and 
medium-sized cities around the world that are seeking to make a long-term transformation from industrial 
or single sector reliance to more a more diversified city economy. This path is first and foremost one of 
demographic and business re-urbanisation, the growth of the knowledge and innovation economy, the 
growing profile of cities as visitor, culture and entertainment destinations, and the need for cities to 
participate in re-organised global value chains.22  
7KLVUHGHYHORSPHQWSDWKRYHUODSVZLWKRWKHUQHHGVDQGLPSHUDWLYHV,QWKHILUVWLQVWDQFH6FRWODQG¶VFLWLHV
have successfully navigated and delivered regeneration and physical improvements, and will need to 
press on with these and continue momentum. In a second, they have constructed more deliberate 
strategies for renewal and economic diversification ± and they are now entering the third phase: building a 
managed metropolis as they capitalise on their initial success and increase the pace of their 
transformation. 
,Q WKLVQH[WF\FOH WKHQ6FRWODQG¶VFLWLHVZLOOQHHG WKH WRROV WRHPEUDFHWKHLUSRSXODWLRQJURZWKDQG WKH
densification that will be needed as a result, so that they can manage and adapt to the externalities that 
come with growth and demand. But they will also require new ways to provide more support to the 
innovation and new modern engineering and manufacturing economies, to advanced traded urban 
services, as well as to solve outstanding governance issues across wider city regions, and develop 
smarter systems for growth and investment management.  
/LNHRWKHUJURXSVRIFLWLHVDURXQGWKHZRUOG6FRWODQG¶VFLWLHVZLOOQHHGWRGHSHQGRQDQLPSURYHGWRRONLWWR
allow them to move from physical management and enhancement of their cores, to co-ordinating and 
upgrading systems across their functional regions. In other words, they need to be empowered ± with 
additional roles, funding and competencies, because they will need and are best-placed to identify their 
infrastructure investment requirements, especially in transport and housing.  And they need these 
additional powers to enable them to deliver intelligent urban design and help create lively, attractive urban 
environments.  
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 www.aberdeencity.gov.uk/nmsruntime/saveasdialog.asp?lID=68726&sID=26262  
2121
 www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-highlands-islands-35833554  
22
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To do so they will require governance mechanisms that are capable of imagining and delivering integrated 
city systems, beyond traditional administrative boundaries and across departmental silos. They will also 
need greater coordination and cooperation between entrepreneurs and knowledge institutions such as 
universities, broadcasters and major hospitals, productive industries and the public sector across multiple 
MXULVGLFWLRQV PRYLQJ DZD\ IURP IUDJPHQWHG DSSURDFKHV WR HFRQRPLF GHYHORSPHQW ,Q VKRUW 6FRWODQG¶V
FLWLHV ZLOO QHHG µPDQDJHG PHWURSROLWDQ DUHDV¶ WKDW DGDSW DQG JURZ LQ ways that do not increase the 
negative externalities of growth, while delivering urban environments that the innovation and knowledge 
economies thrive within.   
5. City devolution ± the English model 
 
:KHQ 6FRWODQG¶V FLWLHV WKLQNDERXW WKH QH[W F\FOH RI UHIRUPVDQG DGMXVWPHQWV WKH\PLJKW WDNH REYLRXV
LQVSLUDWLRQ IURP WKH(QJOLVK µHDUQHGDXWRQRP\¶PRGHO RI GHYROXWLRQ WKDW KDVPRYHGRQDSDFH LQ UHFHQW
years. This approach was borne out of a recognition of the significant deficits in powers and resources 
faced by large English cities compared to other cities in the OECD, plus  a cross-party political consensus 
on the positive impact of successive metropolitan government reforms in and devolution to London since 
2000.  
The result has been a bespoke mixture of bespoke arrangements, tools, and governance formats 
according to the needs and complexion of each city - a combination of City Deals, Earn Back Schemes, 
Combined Authorities, Metro Mayors, and other initiatives. English cities are effectively earning their 
autonomy by proving their capacity to collaborate and compromise, resulting in a range of different models 
in Manchester, Birmingham, Bristol, Sheffield, Leeds, Liverpool and others.  
There are a number of distinctive elements to the English model: 
x City Deals followed by incremental devolution agreements. City Deals have now been 
awarded to over 30 cities in England.23 The UK government has since sought to expand its 
existing deal with the Greater Manchester Combined Authority, with the potential to grant the 
Mayor powers to raise a Community Infrastructure Levy. Manchester is arguably the biggest 
EHQHILFLDU\RIWKHµ'HDOV¶DUUDQJHPHQWVVRIDULWKDVWKHSRZHUDQGUHVRXUFHVWRDGPLQLVWHULWV
own health and social care systems, and more recently criminal justice powers, with the option 
for further devolution in the future, and commensurate funding support.24 
x Earn Back schemes. Manchester is the first city in the UK to benefit from this model. It has 
agreed with the Treasury the right to retain part of the increase in local tax yields, if these can 
be linked to the outcomes of local infrastructure investment.25  
x Combined Authorities and Metro Mayors. Previously fragmented regions are coming 
together in more formalised governance arrangements in which they can pool resources and 
take collective decisions within a single metropolitan area. Greater Manchester has been 
followed by the West Midlands Combined Authority, the Sheffield City Region, and the 
Liverpool City Region. Combined Authorities are being granted greater powers of infrastructure 
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 www.gov.uk/government/policies/city-deals-and-growth-deals 
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investment, housing, economic development and skills ± alongside dedicated central 
government funding envelopes. Many of these combined authorities are incentivised to create 
a directly elected metropolitan mayor, given the power to increase levies for specific 
infrastructure projects by up to 2% (subject to agreement from the Local Enterprise 
Partnership). 26 Mayoral devolution is also being supported with funding pots dedicated to local 
priorities, currently worth nearly £3 billion for the concerned group of cities.  
At the same time, the UK government will now allow councils in England to keep 100% of their business 
rates from 2020. This should give them control of a further £13bn of local revenue, as support grants from 
central government are phased out. Manchester, London and Liverpool will be able to retain the totality of 
their business rates during a pilot phase, ahead of the general 2020 deadline.27  
The English experience also involves increasing collaboration between cities, whose most high profile 
PDQLIHVWDWLRQ LV WKH ³Northern Powerhouse´ ZKHUH PDMRU LQIUDVWUXFWXUH LQYHVWPHQWV LQ GLJLWDO DQG
transport projects will be co-ordinated, and an integrated transport agency created. More recently, local 
authority leaders in Bristol, Cardiff and Newport have been developing plans for a Great Western Cities 
powerhouse in order to pool regional resources.28  
But despite the pace and variety of innovation in reforms to support English cities in the last five years, 
there remain substantial concerns that the outcomes may not sufficiently empower cities and city regions 
or alter the balance between the central government and the city regions, and that the initiatives 
themselves are incorrectly viewed as a magic bullet. This invites consideration of other models around the 
ZRUOGWKDWPD\EHUHOHYDQWWR6FRWODQG¶VFLWLHV 
6. 2(&'H[DPSOHVRIILVFDORWKHUGHYROXWLRQPRGHOVIRU6FRWODQG¶VFLWLHV" 
 
Whilst it is understandable for Scottish cities to look to the English model of empowerment, especially as 
6FRWWLVKDQG(QJOLVKFLWLHVVKDUHWKHVDPH8.IUDPHZRUN6FRWODQG¶VFLWLHVKDYHSOHQW\RIUHDVRQVWRORRN
beyond the limited experience of their English counterparts as they look to adjust to the next cycle of their 
development.  
Scottish cities have important distinctions from their English neighbours in relation to their population sizes, 
economic functions, and geographies (especially the relative distances from London) which is such a 
major issue for English cities. They also have different and distinctive relationships with their wider regions 
and rural areas.   
*LYHQ WKH VFRSH WKDW 6FRWWLVK *RYHUQPHQW KDV WR ³VKDUH´ RU GHYROYH SRZHUV WR WKHVH FLWLHV WKH\ PD\
justifiably look to more ambitious models and approaches developed elsewhere in the world. Although the 
English model is a current example of progressive devolution, there are other options for Scottish cities to 
draw upon. 
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Table 2: Example models from around the world 
 Pre-reform 
political structure 
Post-reform 
political structure 
Region/city 
fiscal 
independence 
Key Powers and 
Responsibilities 
Outcomes and 
Improvements 
New 
Zealand 
(Auckland) 
Fragmented city 
councils, poor 
regional 
cooperation 
Unitary Council- 
regional 
government after 
merger of 8 
councils. 
Moderate 
Economic 
development, 
infrastructure, key 
services 
Improved regional 
integration, 
enhanced 
cooperation with 
the state. 
Chile 
Disempowered 
municipalities, 
strong central 
government with 
control over 
regional and 
municipal policy 
Regional 
devolution, powers 
³GRZQORDGHG´IURP
the state to the 
regions 
Moderate 
Economic 
development, 
social policy, 
housing and 
infrastructure 
Much enhanced 
metropolitan 
coordination for 
Santiago and other 
cities 
Finland 
Surfeit of 
municipalities, no 
regional authorities. 
Fewer 
municipalities after 
multiple mergers, 
joint municipal 
boards, voluntary 
³UHJLRQDOFRXQFLOV´ 
High 
Infrastructure and 
service provision, 
notably in health, 
education and 
social services 
Services, planning 
and infrastructure 
aligned to 
functional 
geographies. 
Belgium 
Balance between 
federal state and 
regional 
governments 
Substantial 
devolution of 
powers to Regional 
Governments, 
themselves 
increasingly 
stewards of 
metropolitan 
governance. 
High 
-Regions: 
economic 
development, land 
use, employment, 
housing, 
infrastructure and 
transport systems. 
-Cities: local 
spatial planning 
and infrastructure 
delivery 
Greater regional 
ownership of policy, 
improved 
metropolitan 
coordination 
 
 
7. 1HZ=HDODQGWKHIXOOµUHJLRQDOPHUJHU¶PRGHO 
 
New 
Zealand 
Population 
(2014) GDP /cap (2014) 
4.5m $31,500 
     
Auckland 
Population 
(2014) GDP/cap (2014) City Budget 
% of City Budget raised 
from Central 
Government transfers 
1.6m $31,800 NZ$3.8bn 15% 
Sources: Brookings Global Metro Monitor (2015), Clark and Moonen (2015), and IMF World Economic Outlook 
Database.29 
New Zealand has undertaken significant city regional governance reform in the past decade, particularly 
focused on its largest city Auckland. Until recently, Auckland endured significant governance fragmentation 
                                                          
29
 www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/01/weodata/index.aspx; www.brookings.edu/research/global-metro-monitor/; 
Clark and Moonen (2015).  International Background Report for the New York Fourth Regional Plan - Global City 
5HJLRQV&DVH6WXGLHVDQG*RRG3UDFWLFH+RZDUHWKHZRUOG¶VOHDGLQJUHJLRQVWDFNOLQJWKHLUORQJWHUPFKDOOHQJHV" 
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across eight separate councils, which did not successfully coordinate metropolitan growth. Auckland was 
viewed as a city of sprawl and motorways, poor public transport and a declining city centre. This 
fragmentation made collaboration with central government difficult, as it lacked a unified urban body with 
which to interact and coordinate investments.  
$XFNODQG¶VVXFFHVVIXOELGWRKRVWWKH5XJE\:RUOG&XSEHFDPHDVWLPXOXVIRUPXFKZLGHUUHIRUP30 
A Royal Commission was set up to consider governance solutions and led to the creation of a new 
amalgamated city government within 18 months that replaced the councils with a unified city region and a 
directly elected mayor in 2010. The new Regional Council was complemented by a number of Council 
Controlled Organisations which manage key investment and infrastructure services under the Regional 
&RXQFLO¶V JXLGDQFH 7KLV UHIRUP JDYH $XFNODQG WKH DELOLW\ WR KDUPRQLVH GD\ WR GD\ IXQFWLRQDOLW\ LVVXHV
across the region (e.g. waste management, roads), as well as the ability to coordinate strategic planning in 
infrastructure and economic development.31  
As a result of the amalgamation, Auckland has increased its rate of investment as council assets and 
resources were pooled, and regional decision making and cooperation with central government were 
simplified. The merger saves £80m a year for the Council, and capital investment has been raised to 
£800m in 2016/2017 with significant progress in the pace of public transport development. A new 
harmonised rating system has been created, while the ability to negotiate with central government enables 
both bodies to better align their strategic priorities and funding streams. The benefits are particularly visible 
in housing, where a Housing Accord was agreed with central government to increase the supply of new 
homes. The amalgamated council has also drawn up a strategic plan for spatial and economic 
GHYHORSPHQW WKH $XFNODQG 3ODQ ZKLFK DOORZV FLW\ OHDGHUV WR ³WKLQN UHJLRQDOO\´ DERXW LQtegrated 
development aims and to mobilise local and central resources towards a common objective.32  
8. Chile: de-centralisation to empowered regional governments 
 
Chile 
Population (2014) GDP /cap (2014) 
17.8m $23,000 
     
Santiago 
Metropolitan 
Region 
Population (2014) GDP/cap (2014) Regional Investment Budget 
% of budget raised 
from transfers 
7.2m $24,000 $171m 48% 
Sources: Brookings Global Metro Monitor (2015), Santiago Metropolitan Region, and IMF World Economic Outlook 
Database.33  
Historically, it has been central government that took all major strategic investment and economic 
GHFLVLRQV DFURVV &KLOH¶V FLWLHV 0D\RUV DQG UHJLRQDO JRYHUQRUV ZHUH RQO\ HVWDEOLVKHG FRPSDUDWLYHO\
                                                          
30
 http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/56260/; http://anzrsai.org/assets/Uploads/PublicationChapter/186-
Dollerysustainingregionsarticle.pdf 
31
 www.knowledgeauckland.org.nz/assets/publications/Governance-of-Auckland-5-years-on-May-2016.pdf  
32
 http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/56260; www.knowledgeauckland.org.nz/assets/publications/Governance-of-Auckland-5-
years-on-May-2016.pdf; https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=xt4w5OCby14C&pg=PA416; 
http://localgovernmentmag.co.nz/amalgamation/nz-councils/  
33
 www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/01/weodata/index.aspx; www.brookings.edu/research/global-metro-monitor/; 
www.dipres.gob.cl/595/w3-multipropertyvalues-14338-23712.html  
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recently, and even democratisation at the local level had not been matched by a significant transfer in 
power: cities were local extensions of central government that by-passed the regions.34 But Chile is now 
creating an empowered intermediary tier of government between local authorities and the state. 
In 2015, in a bid to de-centralise decision making in Chile, a bill paved the way for the direct election of 
regional governors by 2017, and the transfer of greater fiscal resources, as well as new regional powers 
over economic development, social issues, housing and infrastructure. Elected governors will come first, 
and the transfer of powers and revenue will happen gradually thereafter. The regions are becoming 
responsible for three core areas: economic development; social provision; and infrastructure and transport 
with key civiOVHUYDQWVIXQGVDQGSRZHUV³GRZQORDGHG´GLUHFWO\IURPFHQWUDOJRYHUQPHQWPLQLVWULHVWRWKH
regions.35  
This reform will have notable repercussions in the capital, Santiago. 32 of its municipalities will now be 
more effectively coordinated and governed at the scale of an empowered province, effectively providing 
metropolitan government where before the state had to deal with each municipality on a case by case 
basis. This represents a radical step change from a highly centralised system. 
9. )LQODQG¶VPRGHORIurban devolution 
 
Finland 
Population 
(2014) 
GDP /cap 
(2014) 
Inter-governmental transfer 
revenue as percentage of 
total revenue for each level 
of government  (2014) 
Tax revenue as percentage 
of total revenue for each 
level of government (2012) 
5.5m $40,300 Local: 29.7% Local: 45.4% 
     
Helsinki 
Population 
(2014) 
GDP/cap 
(2014) City Budget 
% of budget raised from 
transfers 
1.6m $47,500 $5.7bn 5% 
Sources: Brookings Global Metro Monitor (2015), Helsingin kaupunki, and IMF World Economic Outlook Database.36 
 
)LQODQG¶V PXQLFLSDOLWLHV ZRUN LQ D KLJKO\ GHFHQWUDOLVHG V\VWHP DQG DUH VWURQJO\ HPSRZHUHG WKLV LV
because there is no intermediate (regional) tier, only the state and municipalities. As a result, each 
municipality possesses strong powers over infrastructure and service provision, notably in health, 
education and social services. They are also very fiscally devolved with only 18% of their income coming 
from central government transfers and equalisation schemes; the remaining 82% is raised from local 
income tax, levies and user charges.37 
This strongly decentralised system has also helped create a culture of collaboration. Individual Finnish 
local governments often come together to deliver key services to achieve economies of scale ± delivered 
                                                          
34
 3IOLHJHU*³6DQWLDJRGH&KLOH3URWRW\SHRIWKHQHR-liberal city: between a strong state and privatised public 
VHUYLFHV´LQ/RUUDLQ'*RYHUQLQJ0HJDFLWLHVLQHPHUJLQJFRXQWULHV/RQGRQ5RXWOHGJH 
35
 http://chiledescentralizado.cl/diez-anos-podria-demorar-el-traspaso-de-las-atribuciones-de-los-actuales-intendentes-
a-nuevo-gobernador-regional/; 
www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=ECO/WKP(2016)13&docLanguage=En  
36www.hel.fi/static/kanslia/ta2017/ta.html; www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/01/weodata/index.aspx; 
www.brookings.edu/research/global-metro-monitor/ 
37
 https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=3iXjAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA103 ; www.centreforcities.org/reader/beyond-business-
rates/evidence-for-fiscal-devolution/1-international-comparisons/ 
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by jRLQW PXQLFLSDO ERDUGV VHW XS WR SHUIRUP VSHFLILF WDVNV 7KXV )LQODQG KDV ³KRVSLWDO UHJLRQV´ MRLQWO\
DGPLQLVWHUHG E\ PXQLFLSDOLWLHV IRU LQVWDQFH ,Q DGGLWLRQ PXQLFLSDOLWLHV FRQJUHJDWH LQ ³UHJLRQDO FRXQFLOV´
which act as assemblies of municipal representatives which discuss regional development, planning and 
coordination issues. In the Helsinki Metropolitan Area, the largest urban area in Finland, municipalities are 
required to set up co-operative plans for land use, transport, housing and services that are coordinated 
and delivered across the metropolitan region. 
The Finnish government has also been supporting the voluntary merger of municipalities. Already between 
2005 and 2016, it had reduced the number of municipalities by more than a quarter. This reduction is 
largely to provide more effective metropolitan or regional forms of urban government, and to achieve 
further economies of scale in service delivery. In larger urban areas, the government has pushed for 
mergers so that municipal boundaries keep up with the functional urban regions. It has even been ready to 
impose mergers where it considers them financially necessary and will consider doing so after an initial 
voluntary phase expires in 2017. Importantly, the law provides for the protection of public service jobs 
following mergers, for a five year period.38  
10. The Belgian devolution model 
 
Belgium 
Population 
(2014) 
GDP /cap 
(2014) 
Inter-governmental transfer 
revenue as percentage of 
total revenue for each level 
of government  (2014) 
Tax revenue as percentage 
of total revenue for each 
level of government (2012) 
11.2m $43,000 Region: 64.5% Local: 47.2% 
Region: 15.5% 
Local: 31.4% 
     
Brussels 
Capital 
Region 
Population 
(2014) 
GDP/cap 
(2014) 
Regional 
Budget 
% of budget raised from 
transfers 
1.2m $46,300* $4.43bn 13% 
Sources: Brookings Global Metro Monitor (2015), Brussels Capital Region, and IMF World Economic Outlook 
Database.39 
*Figure for Metropolitan area. 
Belgium has a complex system of devolved government, owing to its linguistic and cultural diversity. It is a 
federal state, which oversees three regions: Flanders, Wallonia and the Brussels Capital Region.  The 
cities themselves experienced a wave of amalgamations during the 1970s and 1980s, however, which 
after teething issues came to greatly improve regional coordination. 
Belgian regions are examples of highly empowered devolved administrations, which grant their own cities 
autonomy on local spatial planning and infrastructure delivery, and offer them considerable infrastructure 
investment and coordination support at the wider metropolitan and regional levels. This model means that 
spatial plans are greatly facilitated, coordinated and part-funded by regional levels of government. The 
                                                          
38
 www.civitas.org.uk/content/files/DevolvedHealthcareinFinland.pdf; 
www.kunnat.net/fi/palvelualueet/kuntaliitokset/ajankohtaistilanne/Sivut/default.aspx ; 
www.virtuaalikunta.net/fi/tietoa/kuntaliitokset/Sivut/default.aspx  
39
 http://be.brussels/files-fr/a-propos-de-la-region/finances/budget-regional/2015/expose-general-du-budget-2015; 
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/01/weodata/index.aspx; www.brookings.edu/research/global-metro-monitor/ 
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regions themselves are governed by their own parliaments and possess strong powers on economic 
development, land use, employment, housing, infrastructure and transport systems.40 
The 2014 transfer of powers was one of the most significant in Belgian history. These consolidated 
UHJLRQV¶SRZHUVRYHUKHDOWKVocial, urban and spatial policy, and were accompanied by a transfer of a 
IXUWKHU¼EQLQIHGHUDOVSHQGLQJWRUHJLRQDOFRQWURODQGE\JUHDWHUILVFDODXWRQRP\ZRUWKDSSUR[LPDWHO\
¼EQ7KH UHJLRQV WKHPVHOYHV FDQ OHY\ VXSSOHPHQWDU\ WD[HVRQ LQKHULWDQFH WD[, road taxes and other 
taxes ± and transfer some of them to the municipalities, which themselves levy a property tax.41 The 
Belgian model has been highly effective for urban adjustment in many Belgian cities, although less so in 
Brussels whose own regional boundary does not span the metropolitan area.42   
11. :KDWFRXOGZRUNIRU6FRWODQG¶VFLWLHV± and Scotland? 
7KHUHLVQRDEVROXWHUHTXLUHPHQWIRU6FRWODQG¶VFLWLHVWRIROORZDQ(QJOLVKPRGHOIRUGHYROXWLRQ7KHYDOXH
of having the English cities in their current mode of devolution allows Scotland to learn from what has 
worked - and not worked so well.  
More imporWDQWO\6FRWODQG¶VFLWLHVPD\ZDQWWRORRNRXWVLGHWKH8.WRZLGHU2(&'H[SHULHQFHDQGSXUVXH
RSWLRQVWKDWKDYHQRWEHHQDYDLODEOHLQ(QJODQG1HZ=HDODQG¶VPRUHDPELWLRXVFRQVROLGDWLRQVRU&KLOH¶V
VWURQJVHFRQGWLHUFLW\ UHJLRQDOJRYHUQPHQWRU)LQODQG¶Vmore devolved fiscal and service system might 
suit Scotland much better than the English model which is in part motivated by the need to embrace a very 
wide range of cities with rather different appetites for self-reliance.  
Via the OECD and the World Bank a wide range of other models are available to Scotland. There is the 
opportunity to think not so much about what incremental agreements might be allowed by the UK Treasury 
EXW LQVWHDG WRDVNZKDWGRHV6FRWODQGDQG6FRWODQG¶VFLWLHVQHHG" ,Q WKLV UHJDUG Where appear to be at 
OHDVWWKUHHSULRULWLHVWKDWDQ\6FRWWLVK³FLWLHVGHYROXWLRQ´SDFNDJHVKRXOGHPEUDFH 
x Fiscal devolution: It should provide sustained resources for cities to enable them to make major 
investments in city-regional infrastructure and housing investment, for example via locally-levied 
revenues (e.g. residential and property tax, land tax, tourism levies etc.). 
x Integration of services: It should enable integrated approaches to public transport (road, rail, bus, 
tram and active travel), health, unemployment, care, adult skills, and employability, so that these 
budgets can be combined to achieve greater impact.   
x Incentivise cities to invest: It should produce resources sufficient to promote continuous 
UHLQYHVWPHQW LQ WKH EXLOW HQYLURQPHQW DQG FLW\ PDQDJHPHQW VR WKDW 6FRWODQG¶V FLWHV DGMXVW
successfully to the new disruptive technologies and the economies that they foster. 
So, the question is less whether the English model is right one for Scotland and its city-regions, but rather 
whether it is the best model available across the OECD.  
                                                          
40
 www.belgium.be/fr/la_belgique/pouvoirs_publics/regions/competences; http://europe.uli.org/report/brussels-antwerp/  
41
 http://europe.uli.org/report/brussels-antwerp/; www.parliament.scot/ResearchBriefingsAndFactsheets/S4/SB_14-
88_Fiscal_Devolution_-_Some_Comparative_Examples.pdf  
42 Ibid.  
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The debate might consider better how to take elements from distinctive reforms that have appeal in 
Scotland and to combine them in a mix that supports Scottish cities to flourish both as individual cities, and 
as a system of cities that work together to enhance investment and prosperity.  
But how to make a start?  There are three steps that might be taken straight away. First, the Scottish 
Government could initiate an invitation for the Scottish cities to submit proposals on reforms that go 
beyond or are different to those developed in England. Second, Scottish Cities should consider which 
reforms they wish to promote and how they would use them to raise productive investment and pursue 
greater prosperity for Scotland.  Third, businesses, universities and other civic leaders should work with 
the cities to design key reforms and promote them to the Scottish GovHUQPHQW7KLVEDVLFPRGHORIµDFWLRQ
WDONLQJ¶ KDV XQGHUSLQQHG UHFHQW UHIRUPV LQ 1HZ =HDODQG )LQODQG DQG &KLOH ,W LQYROYHV EHLQJ RSHQ WR
reforms and testing them transparently through sound research and informed public debate. 
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Fair work and productivity  
Gail Rogers and Kenny Richmond1 
 
Abstract 
 
Fair work can be defined as work that offers effective voice, opportunity, security, fulfilment and respect.  
Fair work can be a significant driver of productivity for Scotland, and contributing to growth that is inclusive.  
7KHDYDLODEOHHYLGHQFHVXJJHVWVWKDW6FRWODQG¶VSHUIRUPDQFH in fair work, as measured across its different 
elements, is generally mixed to poor.  The adoption of fair work practices does not have to involve a cost 
to employers and indeed there may be financial benefits to them.  Employee engagement underpins 
effective voice, and influences many other fair work elements, and skills utilisation underpins fulfilment. 
Scotland performs poorly on both these elements, so a specific focus on these could have wide ranging 
benefits and impacts for Scottish companies and workers. 
 
1. Introduction  
3UHYLRXVUHVHDUFKKDVVHWRXWHYLGHQFHRQ6FRWODQG¶VSHUIRUPDQFHRQDUDQJHRIGULYHUVRISURGXFWLYLW\2. 
7KLVSDSHUFRQVLGHUVWKHHYLGHQFHRQµIDLUZRUN¶DVDIXUWKHUGULYHURISURGXFWLYLW\)DLUZRUNLVDOVRDNH\
element of ,QFOXVLYH*URZWKDVRXWOLQHGLQ6FRWODQG¶V(FRQRPLF6WUDWHJ\3.  
7KLVSDSHURXWOLQHVHYLGHQFHRQWKHLPSDFWIDLUZRUNFDQKDYHRQSURGXFWLYLW\6FRWODQG¶VSHUIRUPDQFHRQ
the elements of fair work, and the policy implications of performance gaps.  
2.  What is µ)DLUZRUN¶" 
There is a growing body of evidence about the importance of fair work practices and its impact on 
employees, employers and economic performance. Fair work plays a key role in supporting the positive 
behaviours and attitudes of employees that can lead to improved business performance, innovation and 
productivity, and can lead to better quality jobs. 
In March 2016 the Scottish Fair Work Convention published their Fair Work Framework4 which, while 
primarily aimed at business employers (workplaces), is also intended to be used by any employer and 
organisations that have an interest and/or involvement in the labour market to help direct their activities to 
VXSSRUWIDLUZRUN)DLUZRUNLVDOVRDNH\IRFXVRIWKH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶V/DERXU0DUNHW6WUategy5.  
 
                                                          
1
 Scottish Enterprise is Scotland's main economic development agency and a non-departmental public body of the 
Scottish Government. It works with partners in the public and private sectors to identify and exploit the best 
opportunities to deliver a significant, sustainable and inclusive impact on the Scottish economy.   
2
 For example, see Scotland's productivity performance : latest data and insights. Fraser of Allander Economic 
Commentary, 39 
3
 6FRWODQG¶V(FRQRPLF6WUDWHJ\, Scottish Government 
4
 Fair Work Framework 
5
 6FRWODQG¶V/DERXU0DUNHW6WUDWHJ\, Scottish Government 
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7KH)DLU:RUN&RQYHQWLRQ¶VGHILQLWLRQRIIDLUZRUNLV 
Work that offers effective voice, opportunity, security, fulfilment and respect; that balances the rights and 
responsibilities of employers and workers and that can generate benefits for individuals, organisations and 
society 
The Framework highlights five elements of fair work: 
1. Effective voice: effective channels of communication in workplaces along with a safe environment 
that enable workers to contribute to discussions, be listened to and make a difference, promoting 
an environment of employee engagement.  
2. Opportunity: ensuring that everyone who wants to can access work and, in work, can develop 
and progress.  
3. Security of employment: including stability and predictability of employment, working time and 
income. 
4. Fulfilment: developing and utilising skills, career advancement and employee engagement. 
5. Respect: ensuring workers are respected in terms of, for example, health, wellbeing and safety 
regardless of their role or status.  
The basis of this definition is that all work should be fair, and that fair work should be available to everyone 
regardless of their job, industry, age, race, gender and geographic location.  Of all of the elements, the 
Convention considers effective voice to be the most important. 
3.  Fair work and productivity  
While fair work obviously benefits employees there is evidence that it can also increase business / 
organisational performance and productivity. Productivity is a measure of output relative to inputs, and for 
very many businesses their most important and costly input is staff. If businesses can get more out of their 
employees, not through exploitation but by making work fair and fulfilling, their productivity should 
increase, as should their competitiveness. 
A range of evidence shows that a more diverse, skilled workforce (opportunity) is more likely to produce 
and generate new ideas and insights; increased employee engagement (effective voice) enables these 
new ideas to be utilised to increase creativity and innovation; and a secure environment (security, 
fulfilment, respect) IDFLOLWLHVDQGHQFRXUDJHVWKH³GLVFUHWLRQDU\HIIRUWV´µJRLQJWKHH[WUDPLOH¶RIZRUNHUV - 
all of which underpin higher worker performance, innovation and productivity (see Appendix One for more 
detailed evidence on the links between fair work and productivity). 
7KH HYLGHQFH RQ 6FRWODQG¶V SHUIRUPDQFH DFURVV WKH HOHPHQWV RI IDLU ZRUN LV OLPLWHG DQG WKLV SDSHU
summarises what is available. 
 
Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary, December 2016  
53 
 
(i) Effective Voice - employee engagement 
Research shows that higher levels of employee engagement, a key aspect of effective voice, are strongly 
linked to higher levels of business financial performance and productivity, reduced staff turnover and 
absenteeism, and enhanced employee organisational commitment.   
However, the evidence suggests that the UK performs poorly on employee engagement compared with 
many other EU countries (and it is assumed that Scotland performs similarly to the UK).  For example, the 
European Participation Index6 comprises four indicators of effective voice/employee engagement: 
Workplace Representation (presence of a representation body and consultation rights), Board 
Representation (country level legislation regarding employee representation on boards), Trade Union 
Density (% of workers that are member of a trade union) and Collective Bargaining Coverage (% of 
workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement).  
Overall, the UK ranked second bottom (26 out of 27) in this index in 2010. For Board Representation, the 
UK was one of 12 countries with no legislation covering this, and the UK was ranked 24th for Worker 
Participation, 21st for Collective Bargaining and 15th for trade union density.  
 
Figure 1: European Participation Index (engagement) 2010 
 
Source: The European Participation Index. Index is a scale of 0 (low) to 1 (high) 
Similarly, the Global Perspectives 2015 survey of 20 countries ranked the UK only 12th in terms of 
employee engagement, below the global average score7. The survey also examined additional employee 
engagement indices linked to Wellbeing, Diversity and Innovation8. The UK was in the 3rd quartile for 
Innovation and the 2nd TXDUWLOH IRU ERWK 'LYHUVLW\ DQG :HOOEHLQJ 7KLV PD\ H[SODLQ WKH 8.¶V RYHUDOO rd 
                                                          
6
 European Participation Index 
7
 Global Perspectives 2015 Employee engagement measured by a mix of employee views about whether how the 
workplace is well managed; whether work policies support workers; physical work environment; job security; equality & 
feeling valued; whether organisation cares about health & wellbeing. 
8
 Wellbeing = health of the workforce; Diversity = workplace representing the wider labour market profile; Innovation = 
employees motivated to think creatively and develop new ways of working 
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quartile performance ± employees may be less motivated and empowered to think creatively and look for 
new and better ways of working than those in other countries. 
Overall, the evidence suggests low levels of employee engagement in the UK, and by implication 
Scotland, compared to other countries. If employers are to benefit from the expertise and creativity of 
their employees, they must allow and encourage employees to voice their opinions and ideas. There 
needs to be formal channels and a safe environment in more businesses and organisations to allow this to 
happen, and employees must be able to see the benefits. 
Both collective voice, primarily through trade unions (although a trade union presence is not essential to 
develop a collective voice culture and approaches), and individual voice practices (such as written two way 
communication and face-to-face meetings between senior managers and employees) within organisations 
play key roles in increasing engagement.  However, collective voice alongside individual voice produces 
the best outcomes for employees and for businesses in terms of employee commitment9.  
(ii) Opportunity - development, diversity, progression 
Employers that invest more in employee training tend to have higher productivity, and a more diverse 
workforce also impacts positively on productivity. Opportunities for progression can boost engagement, job 
satisfaction and staff retention (all boosting productivity) by giving employees more confidence in their long 
term career path.  
Opportunity, however, is being impacted by job polarisation in Scotland which is restricting career 
progression as the numbers of mid-skilled jobs are in decline10. This has a higher impact on young people 
and women, as they are disproportionately represented at the low wage/low skill end of the jobs spectrum. 
While job polarisation has been found throughout Europe, the growth in the number of lower skilled/lower 
paid jobs has been greater in the UK (and most likely Scotland) than in many other European countries 
GXHLQSDUWWRWKH8.¶VPRUHGHUHJXODWHGµIOH[LEOH¶ODERXUPDUNHW11.  
Learning and development is a key element of Opportunity and data suggests that Scottish employers 
invest slightly more in learning and development than the UK as a whole, with 70% providing on or off-the-
job training (67% for the UK); 48% having training plans in place (44% for the UK); and 32% having a 
dedicated training budget (30% for the UK)12.  
In terms of international comparisons, 80% of employers in the UK provided Continual Vocational 
Training13 in 2010, ranking the UK 5th out of 28 countries - and higher than the EU-28 average of 66%.14 
This suggests that employers in the UK (and likely in Scotland) are more likely to undertake workplace 
training/development than many other countries. 
                                                          
9
 :K\6KRXOG(PSOR\HUV%RWKHUZLWK:RUNHU9RLFH"´3XUFHOOM	*HRJLDGLV. 
10
 Job polarisation is the process by which the shares of total employment accounted for by both high skill/high wage (or 
non-routine cognitive/interactive) and low skill/low wage (or non-routine, non-skilled) jobs have expanded relative to 
middle-ranked jobs 
11
 Hollowing out and the future of the labour market 
12
 The UKCES Employer Skills Survey 2013 
13
 CVT refers to education or training activities which are financed in total or at least partly by the enterprise 
14
 Vocational education and training statistics 
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,Q FRQVLGHULQJ GLYHUVLW\ 6FRWODQG¶V IHPDOH HPSOR\PHQW UDWH LV KLJKHU WKDQ WKH 8. DQG PRVW RWKHU
European countries, and ScotlanG¶V\RXWKXQHPSOR\PHQWUDWHLVRQHRIWKHORZHVWLQ(XURSHDOWKRXJKLWLV
still above pre-recession levels and the overall unemployment rate). This could suggest that in terms of 
JHQGHUDQGDJH6FRWODQG¶VZRUNSODFHVDUHPRUHGLYHUVHWKDQLQVRPHRWKHUFRuntries. However, there is 
evidence of labour market inequalities for ethnic minorities and the disabled in Scotland.  In 2015, the 
employment rate for those from ethnic backgrounds was 59% compared to 73% for the population as a 
whole, and the gap has increased slightly since 2013. The employment rate for people with a disability was 
42% (in 2014). 
7KLV PD\ VXJJHVW WKDW ZKLOH 6FRWODQG¶V ZRUNSODFHV VHHP WR SHUIRUP ZHOO LQ WHUPV RI HPSOR\HH
development and gender/age diversity, there may remain issues around opportunity and diversity for other 
groups ± particularly ethnic minorities and those with a disability.  
(iii) Security - pay and contracts 
Job security is a significant aspect of employee engagement, as employees that feel secure are more 
ZLOOLQJWRDGDSWDQGFKDQJHDQGWR³JRWKHH[WUDPLOH´WKDQWKRVHZKRIHHOLQVHFXUH,WFDQDOVRLQFUHDVH
commitment, job satisfaction, employer-worker trust and can reduce stress.   
The Global Perspectives Survey highlights that although the proportion of employees in the UK that feel 
VHFXUHLQWKHLUMREKDVLPSURYHGWKH8.¶VSHUIRUPDQFHVWLOOODJVZHOOEHKLQGPRVWRWKHUFRXQWULHVWKH8.
is ranked 16th out of 2015.  
7KHUHSRUWGRHVQRWVHWRXWWKHUHDVRQVZK\WKH8.ODJVEXWRQHPD\EHWKHLQFUHDVHLQµQRQ-VWDQGDUG¶
forms of working, defined as self-employment and part-WLPH DQG WHPSRUDU\ ZRUNLQJ 7KRVH LQ µQRQ-
VWDQGDUG¶HPSOR\PHQWWHQGWRUHFHLYHOHVVtraining and those on temporary contracts have more job strain 
and have less job security than employees in standard employment. Their earnings levels are also lower16. 
Recent UK jobs growth has been driven by non-standard working17, and around 40% of UK employment is 
now in non-standard jobs, giving the UK a mid-table performance compared to other OECD countries.  
-REVHFXULW\PD\DOVREHDIIHFWHGE\WKHXVHRIµ]HURKRXUV¶FRQWUDFWV18. However, recent data shows that 
Scotland has the lowest proportion of employees on a zero hours contract of any  UK region  at 2.2% or 
59,000 people in employment, and that this has declined by 0.1 percentage points between 2014 -15, 
whereas in the UK it increased by 0.3%19.   
Pay equality is also an aspect of fair work and although the gender pay gap in Scotland is lower than in the 
UK, and falling, it still remains high. In 2015, women working full time earned 7.3% less per hour than men 
(the gap is 9.4% for the UK as a whole). The UK has the 13th highest gender pay gap of 34 OECD 
FRXQWULHVVR6FRWODQG¶VJDSLVOLNHO\WRODUJHUWKDQWKH2(&'DYHUDJH 
                                                          
15
 Global Perspectives 2015 
16
 Non-Standard Work and Inequality  
17
 In It Together: Why Less Inequality Benefits All  
18
 7KHUHLVQRVLQJOHDJUHHGGHILQLWLRQRIZKDW³]HUR-KRXUVFRQWUDFWV´DUHKRZever a common element to various 
definitions is the lack of a guaranteed minimum number of hours. 
19
 Zero Hours summary data tables 
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The evidence suggests Scotland performs better than the UK as a whole on job security, but less well than 
some other OECD countries due to higher levels of non-standard employment contracts and pay 
inequalities.  
(iv) Fulfilment - job satisfaction 
(PSOR\HH MREVDWLVIDFWLRQ UHVXOWLQJ ODUJHO\ IURPJRRG MREGHVLJQDQGHIIHFWLYHO\XWLOLVLQJDQHPSOR\HH¶V
skills) is positively associated with business performance, productivity and the quality of output and 
service.  This may be partly due to satisfied and engaged employees being more innovative and creative.   
An OECD survey of adult skills in 22 countries in 2013 found that the UK had the 2nd highest level of skills 
underutilisation, with around 30% of workers reporting that they were overqualified for their job. Although 
the data is only for the UK, performance in Scotland is likely to be similar, as the 2015 Employee Skills 
Survey highlighted that 32% of Scottish employers reported that they had staff that were underutilised 
compared to 30% in the UK20. 
7KLVVXJJHVWVWKDWMREVDWLVIDFWLRQOHYHOVLQ6FRWODQG¶VZRUNSODFHVODJWKDWRIRWKHUFRXQWULHV 
(v) Respect - health, wellbeing, and safety of others 
When employees feel respected they display higher levels of commitment to their employer and lower 
levels of DEVHQFHUHVXOWLQJLQORZHUVWDIIWXUQRYHUDOORIZKLFKFDQERRVWDILUP¶VSURGXFWLYLW\  
In considering absence from work due to sickness, in Scotland 2.2% of working hours were lost to 
sickness lost versus 2.1% in the UK, and the average number of days lost per employee was 4.7 
FRPSDUHG WR WKH 8.¶V 21. The incidence of sickness absence of employees in the UK is around the 
OECD average22. 
This suggests that in terms of employee health and wellbeing, that Scotland and the UK have a mixed 
performance compared to other countries. 
OECD: Measuring Job Quality  
The OECD has recently released new data to assess, in broad terms, job quality across countries23. The 
2(&'¶VMRETXDOLW\WKHPHVRIHDUQLQJVTXDOLW\ODERXUPDUNHWVHFXULW\DQGMREVWUDLQTXDOLW\RIWKHZRUNLQJ
environment broadly map onto to the elements of fair work and so are a useful way of measuring how 
Scotland and the UK compare to other OECD countries (refer to Appendix Two for more detail). The 
OECD categorises countries into high, medium and low performers in terms of job quality, and generally 
countries with better quality jobs have higher levels of productivity (Figure 2). 7KH 2(&'¶V
assessPHQWLVWKDWWKH8.DQGVRPRVWOLNHO\6FRWODQGLVLQWKHµPHGLXP¶JURXSRIFRXQWULHVLQWHUPVRI
job quality performance.  
                                                          
20
 Employer Skills Survey 2015  
21
 Sickness Absence in the Labour Market, 2014 
22
 Mental Health and Work   
23
 How good is your Job?  
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Across the three OECD job quality themes, the UK performs less well than other countries on labour 
market security, has average performance for earnings quality, and performs slightly better than many 
other countries for job strain/quality of the working environment. 
(vi) Leadership and management skills 
Previous research24 has highlighted that deficiencies in leadership and management skills in the UK, and 
HVSHFLDOO\ LQ 60(V DUH D SDUWLFXODU IDFWRU LQ WKH 8.¶V ORZHU SURGXFWLYLW\ FRPSDUHG WR RWKHU (XURSHDQ
countries and the US. Many managers in SMEs in Scotland and the UK recognise that their skills are 
undeveloped, and there is a long tail of firms that do not implement management best practices. The 
research also found a generally low up-WDNHRIPDQ\µKLJKSHUIRUPDQFH¶+5SUDFWLFHVVXFKDVLQIRUPDWLRQ
sharing with employees, employee participation in decision making, and training - all key components of 
Effective Voice. 
This implies that better leadership and management performance could impact positively on employee 
engagement which could, in turn, impact positively on productivity. 
 
Figure 2: Productivity of countries with high, medium, low 'job quality performance' 
 
4. Conclusion and implications 
7KLVSDSHUDGGVWRRXUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHIDFWRUVWKDWDIIHFW6FRWODQG¶VSURGXFWLYLW\DQGLQFOXVLYHJURZWK
performance. Fair work clearly benefits employees, employers and the economy in a number of ways:  
x productivity is stimulated by a more active and diverse workforce, by creating more equal, 
balanced and engaging places to work, and fostering an innovation culture 
x fair work leads to better quality and more fulfilling jobs. 
                                                          
24
 Leadership and Management Skills and Practices in Scottish Companies: Evidence Update and Potential 
Implications for SE 
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An additional benefit to companies is that there does not have to be a significant (if any) additional cost 
involved in implementing fair work principles. 
&RPSDUHG WR RWKHU FRXQWULHV WKH HYLGHQFH VXJJHVWV WKDW6FRWODQG¶V SHUIRUPDQFH LV DW EHVW PL[HG DQG
often poor for the five fair work elements (see Figure 3): 
 
Figure 3: 6FRWODQG¶V)DLU:RUNSHUIRUPDQFHE\WKHILYHNH\HOHPHQWV 
Element Performance  Evidence 
Effective 
voice 
Poor UK/Scotland performs poorly on measures of employee engagement 
compared with many other countries.  
Opportunity Mixed Although Scotland performs well in terms of youth and female 
employment rates compared to other countries, performance is poorer 
for other groups and for job progression. 
Security Mixed Scotland has the low (and falling) proportion of people on a zero hours 
contract than other UK regions. However, the proportion of 
employment that is non-standard is likely to be higher than many other 
OECD countries. 
Fulfilment Poor Although a high % of UK employers provide in-work training, levels of 
skills underutilisation are high compared to the UK and nearly all other 
OECD countries. 
Respect Mixed Scotland has a slightly higher rate of sickness absence than the UK 
and other OECD countries, suggesting lower levels of wellbeing. 
Levels of job strain, though, may be lower than the OECD average. 
2YHUDOO WKH DQDO\VLV LQ WKLV SDSHU VXJJHVWV WKDW 6FRWODQG¶V SRRU WR PL[HG SHUIRUPDQFH RQ WKH ILYH
HOHPHQWVRI IDLUZRUN LVDUHDO IDFWRU LQ6FRWODQG¶VPLG-table productivity performance compared to other 
countries.  
Employee engagement is highlighted as a key element of fair work that can drive productivity, and 
evidence suggests that the UK and Scotland do not perform well in this area. Employee engagement is 
important to a number of fair work elements including Effective Voice, Fulfilment and Respect, so a focus 
on increasing levels of employee engagement in Scotland would have a wide impact on fair work 
performance, and company productivity. 
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As the evidence suggests that fair work practices are not adopted by most employers, a challenge for 
Scotland is to raise the awareness of benefits of this to more companies ± and organisations - and to 
develop novel approaches to incentivise and support more companies to adopt fair work principles and 
practices.  
This will involve both the public and private sectors working together to generate further evidence of the 
EHQHILWVRIDGRSWLQJIDLUZRUNSUDFWLFHVWRUDLVHDZDUHQHVVRIWKHVHEHQHILWVDQGWRLGHQWLI\µZKDWZRUNV¶LQ
LPSOHPHQWLQJIDLUZRUNDSSURDFKHV7KH)DLU:RUN&RQYHQWLRQ¶V)UDPHZRUN25 will be a key driver of this in 
Scotland.   
                                                          
25
 Fair Work Framework 2016  
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Appendix One: Evidence of the Impact of Fair Work on productivity  
Effective Voice  
Employee engagement links to higher levels of both productivity and financial performance 2011 Workplace 
Employment Relations Study 
Businesses with employee engagement scores in the top quartile are over 20% more productive than businesses in 
the bottom quartile and also have significantly lower employee turnover and absenteeism. 2013 Employee 
Engagement survey 
 Trade unions can play in effective collective worker voice. Strong trade unions can help deliver a wide range of 
benefits to employees including higher pay levels, job security, equality and enhanced training, as well as increased 
innovation and productivity to businesses. 
Involvement and Productivity: The missing piece of the puzzle? 
Although trade unions are present in almost half of workplaces in Scotland, membership decreased by 9% between 
1995 and 2014, a slightly higher picture than in the UK which saw a decrease of 7%. Trade union membership 2014 
There has been a significant rise in individual voice practices in UK workplaces (written two way communication, 
meetings between senior managers and workers, face to face meetings) and these practices are now present in 
48% of workplaces in the UK (Scottish figures not available). The 2011 Workplace Employment Relations Study 
Research shows that individual voice alongside collective voice produces the best outcomes for workers and for 
firms in terms of employee commitment. 
Scottish Centre for Employment Research (forthcoming) 
Arrangements for individual and collective voice are present in only 10% of UK workplaces and are available to only 
30% of workers. 2011 Workplace Employment Relations Study 
Opportunity (development, progression, diversity) 
67% of organisations where expenditure on learning & development (L&D) had increased in the previous two years 
experienced increases in output as opposed to only 29% organisations where expenditure on L&D decreased.  
Firms where more than 75% of the workforce took part in L&D development activities had higher productivity, other 
things being equal. 
http://www.cipd.co.uk/publicpolicy/policy-reports/investing-productivity-unlocking-ambition.aspx 
Job polarisation is affecting opportunity by restricting career progression as the number of mid-skilled jobs are 
reduced. Scotland's labour market : 'job polarisation' and inclusive growth  
There is a large amount of evidence highlighting the positive impact on productivity from a more diverse workforce. 
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Productivity: getting the best out of people; (WKQLF'LYHUVLW\DQG)LUPV¶([SRUW%HKDYLRXU; SME innovation, exporting 
and growth; The impacts of migrant worker s on UK businesses 
Companies in the top quartile for racial/ethnic diversity in the workforce were 35% more likely to have financial 
returns above their national industry median, and those in the top quartile of gender diversity were 15% more likely. 
Diversity matters 
Security (pay and contracts) 
64% of the employees identify job security as a key driver in employee engagement as the more secure employees 
felt the more likely they were to be engaged. This has become a significantly more important driver in recent years.  
Global Perspectives 2015 
Fulfilment (job satisfaction) 
Employee job satisfaction is positively associated with workplace financial performance, labour productivity and the 
quality of output and service.  There may be many reasons for this, but it may be partly due to satisfied and engaged 
employees being more innovative and creative. Review of evidence on employee wellbeing and its potential impact 
on workplace performance.  
Over 65% of engaged employees that are more engaged feel that their work brought out creative ideas, whereas 
less than 5% of less engaged employees agreed with this. The Innovation Equation 
Enriched job design offers greater opportunity for workers to make a distinctive contribution and impacts positively 
on labour productivity, financial competitiveness, performance and quality.  
Enriched Job design, High Involvement Management and Organizational Performance 
Respect (personal worth) 
A range of evidence shows that when employees feel valued they show higher levels of commitment to the business 
and lower levels of absence and turnover. 
Perceived Organizational Support: A Review of the Literature 
Employees suffering from high stress levels have lower engagement, are less productive and have higher 
absenteeism levels than those not working under excessive pressure. The study revealed that over half of those 
employees claiming to be experiencing high stress levels reported they were disengaged, compared to just one in 
ten employees claiming low stress levels reported they were disengaged (and half of this group claimed to be highly 
engaged). The research clearly shows the destructive link between high levels of stress and reduced productivity. 
The Global Benefits Attitudes survey 
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Appendix Two 
OECD: What makes a good job? 
Most people spend a substantial amount of time at work, and work for a significant part of their life. The 
jobs people hold are therefore one of the most important determinants of their well-being. But what are the 
features of job quality that affect well-being? The OECD framework for measuring and assessing job 
quality considers three objective and measurable dimensions of job quality that are both important for 
worker well-being and relevant for policy. Together, they provide a comprehensive assessment of job 
quality. 
Earnings quality refers to the extent to which the earnings received by workers in their jobs contribute to 
their well-being. While the level of earnings provides a key benchmark for assessing their contribution to 
material living standards, the way earnings are distributed across the workforce also matters for well-being. 
Therefore, the OECD measures earnings quality by an index that accounts for both the level of earnings 
and their distribution across the workforce. 
Labour market security captures those aspects of economic security that are related to the probability of 
job loss and its economic cost for workers. This is measured by the risk of unemployment which 
encompasses both the risk of becoming unemployed and the expected duration of unemployment. 
It is measured by the degree of public unemployment insurance, which takes into account both the 
coverage of the benefits and their generosity. 
Quality of the working environment captures non-economic aspects of job quality and includes factors that 
relate to the nature and content of work performed, working-time arrangements and workplace 
relationships. Jobs that are characterised by a high level of job demands such as time pressure or physical 
health risk factors, combined with insufficient job resources to accomplish the required job duties, such as 
work autonomy and social support at work, constitute a major health risk factor for workers. Therefore, the 
quality of the working environment is measured by the incidence of job strain, which is a combination of 
high job demands and limited job resources 
Overall, job quality outcomes vary substantially across OECD countries on each of the three dimensions: 
x Australia, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, Norway, and Switzerland are 
among the best performers. These countries do relatively well in at least two of the three 
dimensions of job quality, without any outcomes in the bottom-10 of the ranking. 
x Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, France, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Slovenia, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States 
display average performance. Over the three dimensions of job quality, most of these countries 
display no more than one outcome in the top-10 or the bottom-10 of the ranking. 
x Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain and Turkey do 
relatively badly in two or all of the three dimensions of job quality. In addition, none of these 
countries performs very well in at least one of these dimensions. 
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Examining inequalities across travel to work areas in 
Scotland  
John Sutherland 
 
1. Abstract 
This article examines inequalities across the 45 travel to work areas in Scotland, using four indicators of 
labour market performance viz. the employment rate; the economic inactivity rate; the percentage holding 
level 4 (or higher) qualifications; and the percentage having no formal qualifications. The results are then 
contextualised in a discussion of the possible explanations for these inequalities and their implications for 
policy. 
 
2. Introduction 
The process of economic development varies over space and the economic history of Scotland over 
several decades illustrates well how the twin processes of job creation and job destruction have different 
impacts geographically. From the 1950s, demand for the products of ScotlanG¶VWUDGLWLRQDOPDQXIDFWXULQJ
industries, located principally if not exclusively in the west of the central belt, declined further. Job 
destruction followed and there was no compensating job creation to match the magnitude of the job losses 
in these urban areas, with manifold consequences for the local populations. In contrast, from the 1980s, 
job creation was apparent in Aberdeen, its hinterlands and the northern isles, localities historically 
associated more with agriculture and fishing, with the discovery of North Sea oil and the development of oil 
exploration and extraction activities (Alexander et al, 2005: Bell and Blanchflower, 2007: Cameron, 2010: 
Macdonald, 2009: Newlands et al, 2004).   
An important feature of the minority Scottish National Party (6136FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶V ILUVW(FRQRPLF
Strategy set out in 2007 was the identification of a set of targets. These targets took two forms: 
aspirational targets, designed to set long term direction and ambition; and shorter term objectives, 
designed to moQLWRUDQGHYDOXDWHHFRQRPLFSHUIRUPDQFHDQGDSSUDLVHJRYHUQPHQWSROLF\µ&RKHVLRQ¶± by 
ZKLFKZDVPHDQWµUHJLRQDOHTXLW\¶- ZDVRQHRIWKHDVSLUDWLRQV,WZDVFHQWUDOWRWKH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶V
RYHUDOOSXUSRVHRIIRFXVVLQJ³WKH*RYHUQPHQWDQGSXEOLFVHUYices on creating a more successful country, 
ZLWKRSSRUWXQLWLHVIRUDOORI6FRWODQGWRIORXULVKWKURXJKLQFUHDVLQJVXVWDLQDEOHHFRQRPLFJURZWK´6FRWWLVK
Government, 2007, p. 1). Existing inequalities within Scotland were identified and measured in terms of 
VHOHFWHGODERXUPDUNHWLQGLFDWRUVDQGWKHWDUJHWZDVWRQDUURZWKHJDSEHWZHHQ6FRWODQG¶VEHVWDQGZRUVW
performing regions by 2017.  
This article examines disparities across the 45 travel to work areas (TTWAs) in Scotland using selected 
labour market performance indicators. Possible explanations of these disparities are then outlined and 
their policy implications discussed.   
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3. Labour market indicators of performance      
How economic performance should be measured; how Scotland should be sub-divided geographically to 
examine spatial differences in performance; and how inter-area differences in performance should be 
measured are three very problematical issues. 
In its first economic strategy document, the Scottish Government elected to make use of one particular 
labour market indicator ± the activity rate - to measure cohesion, although there are other possible 
indicators of labour market performance (as well as other measures of performance which do not have 
their origin in the labour market).   
Within the population as a whole, at present, those aged 16 years and over are eligible to participate 
formally in the labour market. This subset of the population measures the potential size of the labour force. 
Not all those eligible to participate in the labour market do so. A person is described as economically 
active if he/she is employed or unemployed but seeking and available for work in a particular period. The 
activity rate measures the number economically active as a percentage of those within the population 
eligible to participate in the labour market. As such, it is a measure of the actual size of the workforce in 
that period. It is possible to subdivide the economically active into two groups. The number who have jobs 
expressed as a percentage of those eligible to participate in the labour market measures the employment 
rate. The number who do not have jobs expressed as a percentage of those eligible to participate in the 
labour market measures the unemployment rate.   
The reciprocal of the activity rate is the inactivity rate, measured as the number who are eligible to 
participate in the labour market but who do not do so as a percentage of those eligible to participate. The 
principal economically inactive groups are: people looking after family and home; the long-term sick and 
disabled; the temporarily sick or injured; retired people; and discouraged workers (defined as those who 
consider job search to be futile because of the perceived absence of appropriate vacancies within the local 
economy).    
Measures of the activity rate, the employment rate, the unemployment rate, and the inactivity rate offer 
four different quantitative perspectives of the performance of the labour market.  For a given level of labour 
demand within an economy, the activity rate measures those willing to supply labour; the employment rate 
measures those willing to supply labour who are in employment; the unemployment rate measures those 
who are willing to supply labour but who have no jobs; and the inactivity rate measures those who are not 
participating in the labour market.    
The analysis which follows makes use of two of these quantitative indicators of labour market performance 
viz. the employment rate and the inactivity rate and examines both for people, males and females.  
/DERXU VXSSO\ KRZHYHU KDV D TXDOLWDWLYH DV ZHOO DV TXDQWLWDWLYH GLPHQVLRQ UHIOHFWHG LQ SHRSOH¶V
qualifications and skills. Accordingly, to provide a qualitative perspective of labour market performance, 
two other indicators are also used in the analysis viz. the percentage who hold qualifications to level 4 (i.e. 
degree level equivalent) or higher; and those who have no formal qualifications. These two qualitative 
indicators complement the quantitative indicators of the employment rate and the inactivity rate because, 
at the level of the individual, the possession of qualifications increases the probability that an individual will 
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be in employment and the absence of qualifications is associated with an individual not participating in the 
labour market.   
4. Travel to work areas (TTWAs) 
In the original economic strategy document of 2007, Scotland was sub-divided by local authority areas. 
TTWAs are a preferred geographical area for examination because they reflect self-contained areas within 
which most people live and work. TTWAs are based on a statistical analysis of commuting patterns, 
therefore, rather than administrative boundaries (ONS, 2016). TTWA boundaries are non-over-lapping and 
cover all of the UK, with TTWAs being assigned to countries and regions of England on the basis of where 
the highest proportion of the land area of the TTWA falls (e.g. Berwick is a cross-border TTWA and is 
located in England). Over time, as commuting patterns have changed, with more people traveling longer 
distances to work, so the geographical area covered by TTWAs has tended to increase. Their numbers 
have decreased accordingly  
The most recent configuration of TTWAs uses 2011 Population Census data. Currently, there are two 
defining criteria used in the construction of TTWAs. First, they must have an economically active 
SRSXODWLRQRIDW OHDVW6HFRQGO\DW OHDVWSHUFHQWRIWKHDUHD¶VUHVLGHQWZRUNIRUFHPXVWZRUNLQ
the area and at least 75 per cent of the people who work in the area must live in the area. There are 228 
TTWAs in the UK, of which 45 are in Scotland. 
One consequence of the criteria used to construct TTWAs is that they vary in size, with some being much 
larger than others. For example, the size of the five largest TTWAs in Scotland contrast with the size of the 
five smallest (cf. Table 1). A further consequence of the criteria used is that, sometimes, the statistical 
accuracy of the data varies. Therefore, some data are missing for the smaller TTWAs. This is a feature of 
some components of the analysis in this article. 
Table 1: Travel to work areas (TTWAs): some descriptive statistics 
 
Five Largest TTWAs 
 Glasgow 
 Edinburgh 
 Motherwell and Airdrie 
 Aberdeen  
 Dunfermline and Kirkcaldy  
 
 
1,256,435 
658,057 
424,712 
397,285 
296,288 
 
Five Smallest TTWAs 
 Campbeltown 
 Portree 
 Mull and Islay 
 Broadfoot and Kyle of Lochalsh 
 Ullapool 
 
 
7,741 
7,545 
7,323 
6,992 
6,834 
  
Maximum 1,256,435 
Minimum 6834 
Range 1,249,601 
Mean 118,200.5 
Standard Deviation 221,714.5 
Coefficient of Variation 1.87 
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5. Measuring inequalities 
Although the Scottish Government in its 2007 economic strategy document elected to use the range, it is 
possible to identify several other measures of dispersion (or variability or spread) which may be used to 
examine cohesion (or inequalities).  
The range is the simplest measure of dispersion, calculated as the difference between the largest data 
value of the selected indicators and the smallest data value. It is an imperfect measure because it is 
subject to the vagaries of what is happening at the polar extremes of the distribution. The standard 
deviation is a second possible measure of dispersion. This measures the average amount scores of the 
selected indicators in a distribution of scores deviate from the mean. In this way, it takes into consideration 
all areas, not only those at the tails of the distribution. The greater the variability/spread of these scores, 
the larger is the magnitude of the standard deviation. However, the magnitude of the standard deviation 
depends upon the units used to measure the indicators in question. When there is some difference 
between these ± as there is, for example, in the context of the employment rate and the inactivity rate both 
of which produce relatively high mean scores ± it is often necessary to examine the standard deviation 
relative to the mean. This third measure of dispersion is the coefficient of variation.  This article reports 
results for each of these measures. 
6. Exploring the spatial differences  
The TTWA data analysed are extracted from the Excel data sheets which accompany ONS (2016). Their 
origin is the Annual Population Survey for period April, 2015 ± March, 2016. 
Table 2: TTWA Employment rates: some descriptive statistics 
People Men Women 
 
Five Highest Employment 
Rates 
 
 Fort William 
 Portree 
 Shetland Islands 
 Orkney Islands 
 Broadfoot  & Kyle of 
Lochalsh 
 
 
 
 
91.8 
89.4 
89.1 
85.5 
84.3 
 
Five Highest 
Employment Rates 
 
 Portree 
Fort William 
Shetland Islands 
 Peterhead 
 Golspie and Brora  
 
 
 
 
 
100.0 
93.2 
92.3 
90.6 
88.3 
 
Five Highest Employment 
Rates 
 
 Broadfoot & Kyle of 
Lochalsh 
 Ullapool 
 Fort William 
 Shetland Islands 
 Orkney Islands 
 
 
 
 
91.8 
91.4 
90.5 
85.7 
84.7 
Five Lowest Employment 
Rates 
 
 St. Andrews and Cupar 
 Kilmarnock and Irvine 
 Mull and Islay 
 Alness and Invergordon 
 Girvan 
 
 
 
67.0 
65.8 
65.5 
65.0 
63.7 
Five Lowest  
Employment Rates 
  
St. Andrews and Cupar 
 Girvan 
 Dundee 
 Greenock 
 Ullapool 
 
 
 
71.1 
70.5 
70.4 
67.1 
56.0 
Five Lowest Employment 
Rates 
 
 Newton Stewart 
 Kilmarnock and Irvine 
 Girvan 
 Mull and Islay 
 Alness and Invergordon  
 
 
 
61.5 
59.1 
58.4 
58.3 
58.1 
 
      
Maximum 91.8  100  91.8 
Minimum 63.7  56  58.1 
Range 28.1  44  33.7 
Mean 75.85  79.06  72.97 
Standard Deviation 6.64  7.51  8.61 
Coefficient of Variation 0.08  0.09  0.11 
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There is some evidence of inequality with respect to the employment rate for people across the 45 TTWAs 
using the three measures of dispersion identified (cf. Table 2). Also, it is apparent that the extent of this 
inequality differs between men and women. Although the mean employment rate for men is greater than 
the mean employment rate for women, using the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation as 
summary measures of inequality, inequality is relatively greater for women than for men.  Further, there is 
evidence that the ranking of TTWAs in the distribution by employment rate differs between men and 
women. The TTWAs with the five highest and five lowest employment rates by gender are more dissimilar 
than similar. The value of the pair-wise correlation coefficient between the male employment rate and the 
IHPDOHHPSOR\PHQW UDWH LV RQO\7KHYDOXHRI6SHDUPDQ¶V UKR ± which measures stability in the 
ranking of TTWAs by gender - is (only) 0.5067. 
Table 3: TTWA Inactivity rates: some descriptive statistics 
 
People1 Men2 Women3 
 
Five Highest 
Inactivity Rates 
  
Girvan 
 Mull and Islay 
 Kilmarnock and Irvine 
 Ullapool 
 St. Andrews and Cupar 
 
 
 
 
30.4 
29.3 
27.6 
27.0 
26.5 
 
Five Highest 
Inactivity Rates 
  
Greenock 
 Glasgow 
 Oban 
 St. Andrews & Cupar 
 Dundee  
 
 
 
 
24.1 
22.0 
21.8 
21.6 
20.5 
 
Five Highest 
Inactivity Rates 
 
 Girvan 
 Mull and Islay 
 Kilmarnock and Irvine 
 Newton Stewart 
 Fraserburgh 
 
 
 
 
38.3 
36.4 
35.5 
34.6 
31.3 
 
 
Five Lowest 
Inactivity Rates 
  
Orkney Islands 
 Turriff and Banff 
 Aviemore & Grantown on Spey 
 Shetland Islands 
 Fort William 
 
 
 
 
12.2 
11.7 
10.2 
9.4 
5.3 
 
Five Lowest 
Inactivity Rates 
 
Orkney Islands 
 Alness & Invergordon 
 Pitlochry & Aberfeldy 
 Newton Stewart 
 Shetland Islands 
 
 
 
 
11.6 
11.4 
11.4 
9.8 
4.7 
 
Five Lowest 
Inactivity Rates 
 
 Pitlochry and Aberfeldy 
 Aviemore & Grantown on Spey 
 Shetland Islands 
 Orkney Islands 
 Turriff and Banff 
 
 
 
 
17.7 
15.6 
14.3 
12.8 
10.8 
 
Maximum 30.4  24.1  38.3 
Minimum 5.3  4.7  10.8 
Range 25.1  19.4  27.5 
Mean 20.24  16.48  25.21 
Standard Deviation 5.36  3.95  6.27 
Coefficient of Variation 0.26  0.23  0.24 
 
1. No statistically significant data are available for: Girvan. 
2. No statistically significant data are available for: Ullapool, Campbelltown, Portree, Fort William, Broadfoot and 
Kyle of Lochalsh, Peterhead, Aviemore and Granton on Spey and Golspie and Brora. 
3. No statistically significant data are available for: Ullapool, Portree, Broadfoot and Kyle of Lochalsh and Fort 
William. 
Descriptive statistics for the economic inactivity rate for people, men and women are presented in Table 3 
(although the absence of information for some TTWAs has an incalculable impact on these results). There 
is evidence of inequality across the 45 TTWAs for people for this second quantitative indicator of labour 
market performance. Also, there is some evidence of a difference in the extent of this inequality between 
men and women. The mean inactivity rate for women is greater than the mean inactivity rate for men. 
Using the standard deviation (but not necessarily the coefficient of variation), inequality across the TTWAs 
in inactivity rates is relatively greater for women than for men. Further, there is evidence that the ranking of 
TTWAs in the distribution by inactivity rate differs between men and women. In the context of the TTWAs 
with the five highest inactivity rates, there is no TTWA which is common to both men and women. In the 
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context of the TTWAs with the five lowest inactivity rates, the TTWAs for men and women are more 
dissimilar than similar. The value of the pair-wise correlation coefficient between the male inactivity rate 
and the female inactivity rate is 0.5505 (higher than the corresponding statistic for the correlation between 
PDOH DQG IHPDOH HPSOR\PHQW UDWHV 7KH YDOXH RI 6SHDUPDQ¶V UKR LV 0.5643 (again higher than the 
corresponding statistic for male and female employment rates).    
Descriptive statistics with respect to qualifications are presented in Table 4.  Again using the standard 
deviation and the coefficient of variation as summary measures of inter-TTWA inequalities, inequalities are 
to be observed for both the rate of those possessing level 4 qualifications and the rate of those possessing 
no qualifications.  However, there is no statistically significant relationship between the employment rate 
and the rate of those possessing level 4 qualifications at the level of the TTWA (even after controlling for 
the population size of the TTWAs) (cf. Table 5). Similarly, there is no statistically significant relationship 
between the inactivity rate and the rate of those possessing no qualifications at the level of the TTWA 
(again even after controlling for the size of the TTWA population) (cf. Table 6). 
Table 4: TTWA Qualifications: some descriptive statistics 
With Level 4 Qualifications1  With No Qualifications  
 
Five Highest with Level 4 
  
Pitlochry and Aberfeldy 
Edinburgh 
St. Andrews and Cupar 
Galashiels and Peebles 
Aberdeen 
 
 
 
53.5 
53.1 
50.9 
50.1 
49.5 
 
Five Highest with No Qualifications 
  
Newton Stewart 
 Fort William 
 Kilmarnock and Irvine 
 Thurso 
Greenock 
 
 
 
17.3 
13.6 
13.6 
13.2 
13.1 
 
 
Five Lowest with Level 4 
 
 Turriff and Banff 
 Newton Stewart 
 Thurso 
 Fort William 
 Wick 
 
 
 
29.0 
25.3 
23.4 
22.8 
22.3 
 
Five Lowest with No Qualifications 
  
St. Andrews and Cupar 
 Aberdeen 
 Galashiels and Peebles 
 Peterhead 
 Shetland Islands 
 
 
 
5.2 
4.8 
4.6 
4.3 
2.2 
 
    
Maximum 53.5  17.3 
Minimum 22.3  2.2 
Range 31.2  15.1 
Mean 37.35  9.03 
Standard Deviation 7.71  3.40 
Coefficient of Variation 0.20  0.37 
 
1. No statistically significant data are available for: Ullapool, Portree, Broadfoot and Kyle of Lochalsh, Golspie 
and Brora, Alness and Invergordon and Pitlochry and Aberfeldy.  
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Table 5: Regression results: dependent variable: employment rate 
 
 
 
Coefficient 
 
Standard 
Error 
 
P > |t| 
 
Coefficient 
 
Standard 
Error 
 
P > |t| 
 
Level 4 qualifications 
 
-0.0721 
 
.1308 
 
0.584 
 
.0458 
 
.1380 
 
0.741 
Log of population size    -1.6062 .7677 0.043 
Constant 78.5521 4.9882 0.0000 91.2369 7.7349 0.0000 
Number of 
observations 
  45   45 
F (1, 43) (2, 42)   0.3000   2.3500 
Prob > F =   0.5843   0.1075 
R-squared   0.0070   0.1007 
 
Table 6: Regression results: dependent variable: inactivity rate 
 
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
P > |t| Coefficient Standard 
Error 
P > |t| 
No qualifications .4256 .2517 0.099 .4280 .2474 0.092 
Log of population size    .9491 .6231 0.136 
Constant 16.6346 2.4267 0.0000 6.3041 7.1887 0.383 
Number of observations   39   39 
F (1, 37) (2, 36)   2.86   2.6400 
Prob > F =   0.0993   0.0851 
R-squared   0.0717   0.1279 
 
7.   Explaining spatial disparities and the policy implications  
Different perspectives offer different explanations for spatial disparities in indicators of labour market 
performance. Using the traditional framework of labour economics, disparities are attributable to supply 
and demand factors. Using the more contemporary framework of urban and regional economics, these 
VDPHGLVSDULWLHVDUHDWWULEXWDEOHWRµSHRSOHHIIHFWV¶RUµSODFHHIIHFWV¶/LWWOH 
According to supply-based explanations, spatial differences in the indicators examined above reflect 
spatial differences in the demographic profile. Some groups within the working age population are more at 
risk than others. Individuals in these potentially more vulnerable groups are not distributed randomly over 
space. Rather, they tend to be concentrated into specific localities. Disadvantaged individuals tend to be 
ORFDWHGLQDUHDVRIGLVDGYDQWDJH+07UHDVXU\DQG':3*LYHQWKDWWKHµSUREOHP¶WKHUHIRUH LV
µSHRSOH¶QRWµSODFH¶WKHDSSURSULDWHSROLF\UHVSRQVHLVVXLWDEO\GHVLJQHGDQGWDUJHWHGDFWLYHODERur market 
policies, most frequently skills-based retraining or up-skilling.  
This policy response is a component part of a more comprehensive spatially (or place) -blind, people-
based strategy towards economic development. This strategy focuses upon universal investments in 
human capital ± in education and health especially ± and encourages mobility into areas where individuals 
may be more productive. These policies are complemented with transport and communications 
infrastructure policies designed to facilitate this mobility. According to this neo-liberal perspective, 
ultimately, convergence will follow, as long as factor and capital markets are allowed to operate freely.  
Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary, December 2016  
70 
 
Applying the framework associated with contemporary urban and regional economics, these supply-based 
explanations ignore history, context and path dependency. To illustrate, they ignore (or deny) the 
possibility that weak or no attachment to the labour market may be attributable to the long term absence of 
employment opportunities in the local jobs market. Job destruction, particularly in those sectors which 
KLVWRULFDOO\KDGSURYLGHGHPSOR\PHQWWRLQGLYLGXDOVPDQ\RIZKRPDUHQRZFODVVLILHGDVµYXOQHUDEOH¶KDV
prevailed. And where job creation has been evident, it has been neither of the quantity nor of the character 
to match job aspirations and expectations. The local jobs market, therefore, has structured the labour 
PDUNHW RXWFRPHV ZKLFK DUH REVHUYHG &RQVHTXHQWO\ WKH µSUREOHP¶ LV QRW µSHRSOH¶ EXW µSODFH¶ DQG WKH
notable absence of work in these places. Furthermore, the impact of place goes beyond labour market 
participation ± or otherwise ± because where individuals live is central to every facet of their lives.  
Given this diagnosis of the problem, the appropriate policy response is the design and implementation of 
place-based measures to support the creation of, inter alia, employment opportunities (which is not to deny 
the probability that skills development/enhancement may also be a requirement to ensure that individuals 
are better able to capitalise upon these opportunities). That said, the place-based construct is a contested 
construct and there is no dominant narrative to inform policy. Consequently, there are differing 
perspectives of what constitutes appropriate place-based policies (Barca et al, 2012). However, each 
rejects the neo-liberal analysis and maintains that convergence i.e. the elimination or, more likely, the 
diminution of spatial inequalities - can be achieved only as a consequence of policy interventions to 
promote growth in all areas because all areas are deemed to possess unrealised growth and development 
potential. 
Historically in the UK, these place-based policy interventions have focussed upon infrastructure provision 
DQG VWDWH DVVLVWDQFH WR µGHSUHVVHG DUHDV¶ XVually areas of relatively high unemployment. Invariably, 
infrastructure was associated with roads (e.g. motorways). State assistance was associated with diverse 
(and changing) types of financial support, incentives and subsidies to firms located in these areas or to 
provide incentives to firms to re-locate into these areas. Often it was allied to inward investment strategies, 
designed to attract the branch plants of large, multinational firms. For long, this type of policy intervention 
typified the Scottish experience (McCrone, 1969).  
More contemporary approaches towards place-based policies are associated with several inherent 
features (Barca et al, 2012: McCann and Ortega-Argiles, 2013: Turok, 2008) viz.:  
What is of central importance is the performance of the system as a whole. Removing disparities ± or 
achieving cohesion - therefore, is not the development policy objective. Rather the focus of policy is to 
maximise the development potential latent within all areas; 
The recognition of the salience of history, context and path dependency is equally important. As a 
consequence, policies are responsive to the different needs of different areas. Given the variety of factors 
in diverse geographical locations, therefore, there are many possible pathways to development; 
Policy builds upon local embedded knowledge, and is generated by means of deliberate and participatory 
processes which incorporate local and external principals of relevance; and 
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Policy is enabling, not compensating. Policies are about transforming individual differences into assets 
which contribute to the whole, shaping the potential of all territories and all the people who live in them.  
8. Conclusions 
 
There is evidence of inequalities across the 45 TTWAs in Scotland for the four indicators of labour market 
performance examined. However, the results presented in this article are a point in time snapshot of inter-
TTWA differences measured for the period April, 2015 ± March, 2016. No comment can be made, 
therefore, as to whether these differences have increased or decreased over time and what progress has 
been made (or not made) towards achieving the cohesion aspiration identified in the 2007 Scottish 
Government economic strategy document. 
There are notable elements of continuity between that document and the recently published labour market 
strategy document (Scottish Government, 2016). In the latter, tackling inequalities between regions is 
LGHQWLILHGDVRQHRI WKH µFKDOOHQJHV¶'HVSite decades of (principally Westminster inspired and directed) 
policy interventions, spatial imbalance, manifest, for example in inequalities in employment rates, inactivity 
rates and qualification levels, is a persistent feature of the labour market in Scotland. In the labour market 
VWUDWHJ\GRFXPHQWµFRKHVLRQ¶UHPDLQVRQHRIWKHWDUJHWVWREHXVHGWRPRQLWRUSURJUHVVWRZDUGVUHDOLVLQJ
WKHYLVLRQRIDVWURQJODERXUPDUNHWWKDWGULYHVµLQFOXVLYHVXVWDLQDEOHHFRQRPLFJURZWK¶7KHODERXUPDUNHW
strategy docXPHQWWKHUHIRUHLVQRWµVSDFH-EOLQG¶,WGRHVDFNQRZOHGJHWKDW³LWLVHVVHQWLDOWKDWRXUQDWLRQDO
ODERXUPDUNHWVWUDWHJ\WDNHVDFFRXQWRIUHJLRQDODQGORFDOYDULDWLRQV´6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQWS
That said, there is little by the way of detail aERXWKRZ WKLV UHFRJQLWLRQRI WKHQHHG WR µWDNHDFFRXQW¶RI
these existing spatial differences is to be addressed.  
Successive SNP administrations have focused upon aggregate (i.e. national) indicators of labour market 
performance, partly to benchmark Scottish performance against other comparable countries and partly to 
compare and contrast Scottish performance with what is happening elsewhere in the UK. As a 
consequence, the economic geography of the country, with its manifold spatial inequalities, has tended to 
be ignored. The spatial dimension, however, has been an important feature in both the UK national 
UHIHUHQGXP RQ WKH (8 DQG WKH SUHVLGHQWLDO HOHFWLRQ LQ WKH 86$ 0RUHRYHU µLQHTXDOLWLHV¶ ± imagined, 
perceived and real ± have been forwarded as important factors part explaining this spatial dimension. 
Consequently, it may be politically expedient and economically advantageous for the Scottish Government 
now to re-focus its policy agenda and re-design its governance structures. For example, it should make 
cohesion a policy objective rather than an aspirational target; and it should design a multi-level governance 
framework to produce more place-sensitive policies and procedures which mobilise local actors, assets 
and institutions in the process of economic development.      
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Adjusting the Scottish block grant abatement: the 
algebra of CM and IPC1  
Jim Cuthbert  
 
Abstract 
 
In the Fiscal Settlement negotiations between the UK and Scottish governments earlier this year, one 
important element of the debate crystallised around the choice between the so-called CM and IPC 
methods of adjusting the Block Grant abatement. It is well known that the Treasury's preferred method, the 
CM approach, exposes Scotland to the risk of relative population decline - but the precise mechanism is 
not well known. This note develops a simple algebraic expression for the difference between the two 
methods, and explores some of the implications. 
 
Key words: Scotland, fiscal framework, HMT   
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The review of the Fiscal Settlement methodology scheduled for five years of its operation will be a critically 
important juncture. There is a real danger that the review will become side-tracked into an argument about 
the merits of the Treasury's CM method, relative to the IPC approach. 
 
The purpose of this note is to clarify the algebra surrounding the relative properties of the CM and IPC 
approaches to adjusting the Scottish block grant abatement and to use this to highlight some of the issues 
surrounding the choice of method: and, in particular, to argue that there is a real need now to resolve 
some of the ambiguities surrounding the question of what was actually agreed during the fiscal settlement 
negotiations. 
2. Background. 
 
Under the terms of the post-referendum fiscal settlement, the funding of the Scottish government will come 
IURP WZR PDLQ VRXUFHV DERXW KDOI ZLOO FRPH IURP WKH 6FRWWLVK JRYHUQPHQW¶V EORFN JUDQW GHWHUPLQHG
basically by the Barnett Formula; and about half from taxes, like income tax or a portion of VAT, devolved 
or hypothecated to Scotland. In more detail, the system will operate as follows. There will be an abatement 
WRWKH6FRWWLVKJRYHUQPHQW¶VEORFNJUDQWDVLWZRXOGKDYHEHHQGHWHUPLQHGE\WKHRULJLQDO%DUQHWWIRUPXOD
WR DOORZ IRU WKRVH UHYHQXHV ZKLFK ZLOO EH UDLVHG E\ 6FRWODQG¶V GHYROYHG RU K\SRWKHFDWHG WD[es. This 
abatement will initially be set in a neutral fashion, equal to the revenues raised in the base year in Scotland 
by the relevant taxes. Each year subsequently, this abatement will be increased by some form of 
indexation or adjustment. Agreeing on precisely how this adjustment should be carried out turned out to be 
                                                          
1
 CM ± Comparable Model; IPC ± Indexed per Capita.  
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one of the main bones of contention between the Westminster and Scottish governments during the Fiscal 
Settlement negotiations. 
The final position reached in these negotiations was an uneasy compromise between two possible 
approaches to adjusting the block grant abatement. The two approaches in question are known as the 
Comparable Model, (CM), and Indexed Per Capita, (IPC), approaches, which are basically defined as 
follows. 
x The CM approach LQYROYHVDGMXVWLQJ WKHEORFNJUDQWDEDWHPHQWHDFK\HDUE\DGGLQJRQ6FRWODQG¶V
per capita share of the change in relevant rest of UK, (rUK), tax revenues, multiplied by a 
comparability factor, which represents the initial ratio of Scotland to rUK per capita receipts on the 
relevant tax. 
x The IPC approach involves indexing the block grant abatement each year in line with the growth in 
rUK tax receipts, divided by the relative rate of growth in rUK to Scottish populations. (The approach 
which later came to be denoted as the IPC method was first suggested in Cuthbert, (2015), where the 
unstable nature of indexation methods which did not allow for relative population change was 
discussed.) 
Formal definitions of the two approaches can be found in Annex C to the fiscal agreement between the UK 
and Scottish governments: (UK and Scottish Governments, 2016). 
,QWKHILVFDOVHWWOHPHQWQHJRWLDWLRQVWKH7UHDVXU\¶VDSSURDFKODWWHUO\ZDVWKDWWKH&0DSSURDFKVKRXOGEH
adopted: while the Scottish government held out strongly for IPC. The agreement that was eventually 
reached was as follows: (for details, see Annex C to the fiscal agreement). For the first five years the CM 
approach would be used ± on the understanding that the results over that period would be adjusted to be 
equivalent to use of IPC. After five years, there would be a review. What is stated about this review in 
Annex C is that:- 
x It would be informed by an independent report on the operation of the system to date. 
x The fiscal framework does not include or assume the method for adjusting the block grant beyond 
the five year transitional period. 
x The method to be used after the review would be jointly agreed by both governments. 
There nevertheless appears to be a good deal of confusion about what the agreement actually means. For 
example, the Secretary of State for Scotland, David Mundell, said the following in his statement to the 
House of Commons on 24th )HEUXDU\ DIWHU WKH DJUHHPHQW ZDV UHDFKHG ³For tax, we will use the UK 
*RYHUQPHQW¶V SUHIHUUHG IXQGLQJ PRGHO Under that model the Scottish Government hold all Scotland-
specific risks in relation to devolved and assigned taxes, just like they do for devolved spending under the 
Barnett formula. That is fair to Scotland and fair to the rest of the UK. 
However, for a transitional period covering the next Scottish Parliament, the Governments have agreed to 
share those Scotland-specific risks as these powers are implemented. Specifically, the Scottish 
Government will hold the economic risks while the UK Government will hold the population risks, so the 
Scottish Government will not receive a penny less than Barnett funding over the course of the spending 
review simply due to different population growth. By the end of 2021, a review of the framework will be 
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informed by an independent report so we can ensure that we are continuing to deliver Smith in full, with 
the Scottish Government being responsible for the full range of opportunities and risks associated with 
WKHLUQHZUHVSRQVLELOLWLHV´ 
This statement by David Mundell can clearly be interpreted as implying that the default position is that the 
&0PRGHOLHWKH8.JRYHUQPHQW¶VSUHIHUUHGIXQGLQJPRGHOVKRXOGEHXVHGDIWHUWKHUHYLHZ7KLVIRU
example, was the interpretation taken by the Daily Telegraph, when, reportLQJ RQ 0XQGHOO¶V VWDWHPHQW
WKH\ VDLG WKDW ³Scottish ministers would be expected to start bearing the financial consequences of 
Scotland having lower population growth after a five-year transitional period for the new powers ends´ 
3. How relative population growth drives the difference between CM and IPC. 
It is indeed well known that the difference between the effects of the CM and IPC approaches to adjusting 
the Block Grant abatement relates to relative population change. It is also well known that the difference 
between the two methods is likely to be significant: e.g., a report by the IFS estimated that the revenues 
available to the Scottish government under CM might be some £330 million per annum less than under 
IPC by 2021, and around £1 billion per annum less by 2031: (Bell et al., 2016, page 31). 
What is perhaps less well known is precisely how relative population change affects the difference 
between the two approaches. The purpose of this section is to provide the algebra to fill this gap. 
Some notation is required first of all: suppose that 
 ܽ௞ = the block grant abatement in year k under CM: 
 ܾ௞ = the block grant abatement in year k under IPC: 
let ߛ௞ =  the relative rate of growth of population in rUK as compared to Scotland in year k: 
( so  ߛ௞ ൌ  ௣ೖషభೄ௣ೖೄ  ௣ೖ௣ೖషభ, where ݌௞ௌ and ݌௞ represent population in year k in Scotland and rUK repectively.) 
Then, given the formulae for the CM and IPC approaches set out in Annex C to the fiscal agreement, 
(paras C24 and C31), it turns out that the relationship between ܽ௞ and ܾ௞ is given by the formula 
  ܽ௞ାଵ ൌ  ܾ௞ାଵ ൅  ? ሺ ? െ ߛ௝ାଵିଵ௞௝ୀ଴ ) ௝ܾ                (1) 
(See Annex for proof.) 
Note the following implications of formula (1). 
a) Since ߛ௞ has historically been greater than 1, (in fact, commonly around 1.0035), the terms ሺ ? െ ߛ௝ାଵିଵ ሻ 
will be positive: so the CM abatement will be larger than the IPC abatement. 
b) Further, since the difference between the two approaches is given by the summation term in the above 
formula, the absolute difference will build up cumulatively through time. 
c) Moreover, since ሺ ? െ ିߛ ଵሻ is an increasing function of ߛ, formula (1) contains within itself the potential 
for a re-inforcing feedback mechanism under the CM approach. As the relative size of the CM abatement 
increases through time, this will put increasing pressure on Scottish public expenditure, (or upward 
pressure on Scottish tax rates): leading to depressed relative economic growth: leading to upward 
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pressure on relative population growth in rUK, (i.e., an increase in  ): which, feeding back into formula (1), 
will further increase the difference between the CM and IPC abatements: and so on. 
3. Wider implications. 
 
The purpose of this note is not to pre-empt the review of abatement adjustment methods which is 
VFKHGXOHG WR WDNHSODFH LQILYH\HDUV¶ WLPH%XWRQ WKHRWKHUKDQG WKDW UHYLHZZLOOEHDGLIILFXOWHQRXJK
process in its own right: so it is important that the conduct of the review is not clouded by needless 
arguments. As the algebra in the preceding section demonstrates, (and as confirmed by the Bell et.al. 
estimates), if the review comes down to a choice between the CM and IPC methods, then this choice will 
be very significant for Scotland ± particularly given the potential for the CM method to contribute to a self-
reinforcing process of relative economic and population decline. 
As the above quotation from David Mundell indicates, one of the chief protagonists was able to emerge 
from the fiscal settlement negotiations giving the firm impression that the CM approach would be the 
default position after five years: even though the Annex C wording appears to contradict this. The time to 
root out this potential ambiguity is now: after five years, it will be very difficult to go back to determine who 
said what, and what was actually agreed. The best approach would be for a full record of the negotiations 
to be published: this would be consistent with the pledge made by John Swinney in the course of the 
QHJRWLDWLRQV WKDW ³6FRWODQG¶V 3DUOLDPHQW DQG SHRSOH KDYe a right to see all the key documents´ DV
reported, for example, in The Daily Mail, 7th February 2016).  Failing this, a clear agreed statement should 
be issued now by the Scottish government and the Treasury, confirming that Mundell was wrong, and that 
there is indeed no presumption that the CM approach is the default position after five years. To command 
credibility, such a statement would also have to fill in another vital piece of information which is currently 
missing: namely, what is the resolution mechanism if the Westminster and Scottish governments cannot 
reach agreement in the course of the five year review?   
In the absence of further clarity, there is a danger that argument about the relative status of the CM and 
IPC methods could become a distraction in the review process. The main weakness with the current 
settlement is the extent to which, (even with IPC), it exposes Scotland to the danger of becoming locked 
into a progressive cycle of relative economic decline, and increasingly penal indexation of the block grant 
abatement, if Scotland fails to match rUK in the growth of per capita tax receipts. (It is worth recalling that 
WKH ,)6 UHSRUW %HOO HW DO  QRWHG WKDW 6FRWODQG¶V QHZ ILVFDO DUUDQJHPHQWV ORRN ³increasingly 
unusual´LQLQWHUQDWLRQDOWHUPVZLWK³virtually no insurance for future economic shocks or trends that affect 
6FRWODQG¶VGHYROYHGUHYHQXHVDQGZHOIDUHPRUHWKDQWKH\GRHTXLYDOHQWVSHQGLQJLQU8.´:KHQWKHILYH
year review comes round, there is a real risk, particularly given the secular decline in the North Sea, that 
Scotland will be locked into a just such a cycle of decline. In these circumstances the five year review 
should focus on radical alternatives to IPC indexation ± and should be attempting to put back in place 
arrangements which are consistent with the proper operation of a monetary union. It would be a tragedy if 
the Treasury were able to use the current ambiguity about what was actually agreed post-Smith to distract 
attention into a debate about CM versus IPC: or to use CM as the default position. 
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Annex: Proof of Formula (1). 
In addition to the notation already introduced in section 3, let 
  ܺ௞ denote rUK tax receipts in period k: and let 
  ߙ denote the comparability factor for the CM method. 
According to the definition given in para C22 of the fiscal agreement, (UK and Scottish Governments, 
2016), the comparability factor represents the initial ratio of Scotland to rUK per capita tax receipts: since ܾ଴ , the initial abatement under the IPC scheme, is by definition equal to Scottish tax receipts in the base 
year, it follows that 
  ߙ ൌ  ௕బ௣బೄ ௣బ௑బ        (2) 
From the definition given in para C24 of the fiscal agreement, it follows that 
  ܽ௞ାଵ =  ܽ௞ ൅ ߙ ௣ೖశభೄ௣ೖశభ ሺܺ௞ାଵ െ ܺ௞ሻ      (3) 
And it follows from the definition given in para C31 of the fiscal agreement that 
  ܾ௞ ൌ  ܾ଴ ௑ೖ௑బ ௣ೖೄ௣బೄ ௣బ௣ೖ  , hence 
  ܾ௞ ൌ ߙ ௣ೖೄ௣ೖ ܺ௞ .        (4) 
From (3) and (4), it follows that 
  ܽ௞ାଵ ൌ  ܽ௞ ൅ ܾ௞ାଵ െ ܾ௞ାଵ ௑ೖ௑ೖశభ .      (5) 
Now, since ௕ೖశభ௕ೖ  = ௣ೖశభೄ௣ೖೄ ௣ೖ௣ೖశభ ௑ೖశభ௑ೖ  , it follows that 
 ܾ௞ାଵ ௑ೖ௑ೖశభ ൌ  ܾ௞ ௣ೖశభೄ௣ೖೄ ௣ೖ௣ೖశభ ൌ  ܾ௞ߛ௞ାଵିଵ  . 
Substituting this into (5), it follows that 
  ܽ௞ାଵ െ ܽ௞ ൌ  ܾ௞ାଵ െ ߛ௞ାଵିଵ ܾ௞ : which implies 
  ܽ௞ାଵ െ ܽ௞ ൌ  ܾ௞ାଵ െ ܾ௞ ൅ ሺ ? െ ߛ௞ାଵିଵ ሻܾ௞     (6) 
Summing equation (6) for all values from 0 up to k implies that 
  ܽ௞ାଵ െ ܽ଴ ൌ  ܾ௞ାଵ െ ܾ଴ ൅  ? ሺ ? െ ߛ௝ାଵିଵ௞௝ୀ଴ ሻ ௝ܾ : 
Since, by definition, ܽ଴ ൌ  ܾ଴ , this establishes formula (1). 
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